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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone trained in legal argument is familiar with the topic of
precedent, surely one of the most fundamental concepts within
American jurisprudence.' It lies at the heart of our most pressing
debates at the intersection of law and policy, including those
concerning abortion, immigration, health-care law, and same-sex
marriage. Reams of paper have been devoted to the subject, 2 and
judges and commentators have developed and debated a
sophisticated taxonomy that includes such terms as binding
precedent, 3 persuasive precedent, 4 dicta, 5 foreign precedent, 6 stare
decisis, 7 super precedent,8 and super-strong statutory precedent. 9

1 See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in
Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2037 (1996) ("[Stare decisis] is the most important
application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture ....
");see also
Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution:Four Questions and Answers, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2008) ("[S]tare decisis has emerged as one of the most contested
and interesting topics in constitutional law."); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case
Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 23, 23 (1994) ("Legal analysis-by lawyers,
courts, and academics-typically begins and ends with precedent."); Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 (1987) ("An appeal to precedent is a form of
argument... that is often as persuasive as it is pervasive.").
2 See David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 929 (2008) ("In recent years, there has been a surprising
outpouring of academic literature on the proper role of precedent ...").
3 E.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 756-57 (1988).
4 E.g., Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an
Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 633-34 n.55 (2009); see generally Chad Flanders,
Toward a Theory of PersuasiveAuthority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55 (2009).
6 E.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
955 (2005).
6 E.g., Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 319, 321 (1957); John Yoo, Peeking Abroad?: The Supreme Court's Use of Foreign
Precedentsin Constitutional Cases, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 385-87 (2004).
7 See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 3, at 723 (discussing conflict between stare decisis and
originalism); see generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010). The terms "precedent" and "stare decisis" are often used
interchangeably. Weisgerber, supra note 4, at 633 n.55.
8 E.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent,90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006).
9 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362
(1988) ("Statutory precedents ... often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness.').
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Still, the most basic questions about precedent remain: Why
should a court defer to its earlier decisions? 10 And when, if ever,
should precedent give way? The absence of satisfying answers to
these questions has bred confusion among both judges and
scholars."
This Article argues that the central justification for adhering to
even erroneous precedent-and also for precedent's centrality
12
within our legal order-is what I call the reliance approach.
Under this approach, precedent matters because, and therefore
when, the public has developed reliance interests on the basis of
earlier judicial opinions. Rule-of-law principles and the relative
institutional competencies of the courts and legislatures require
that judges should usually not interfere with these interests by
overturning even wrongly decided precedents. I should be clear at
the outset that the focus of this Article is on what scholars have
called "horizontal precedent," that is, previous rulings issued by
3
the same court.'
10As Fred Schauer has put the question, "[w]hy should the best decision for now be
distorted or thwarted by obeisance to a dead past?" Schauer, supra note 1, at 571.
11 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1173, 1173-74 (2006) (describing the "relationship between precedent and the rule of
law" as "hotly contested" and reviewing competing theories and differing applications of
precedent in several cases). Farber goes on to usefully contrast the views of Justice Powell,
a minimalist who stressed the importance of precedent for the sake of stability and
maintenance of respect for the judiciary, with those of Justice Scalia, who stresses fidelity
to the law over fidelity to the Court. Id.
12 Strictly speaking, it is not necessary that the doctrine of precedent have only one
justification. However, as I demonstrate infra, the primary alternative justifications offered
for precedent do not account for its centrality within our legal order or its operation in
practice. This is not to say that these alternatives should never be considered by judges,
only that much more is needed. The central insight of this Article is that the reliance
approach offers the primary, overarching explanation for the doctrine of precedent that best
describes its moral force, captures many of its features, and provides guidance for how
judges should address the precedent question.
13 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 11) (on file with author) (distinguishing between horizontal and vertical
precedent). The question of why lower courts must adhere to the rulings of higher courts"vertical precedent"-is beyond the scope of this Article. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 929
(" '[Viertical' stare decisis [refers to] the question whether and to what extent higher court
precedents should bind lower courts .. "); see generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (discussing
"hierarchicar' precedent).
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Although some judges and legal scholars have identified
reliance as a relevant factor for the doctrine of precedent, their
treatment of the issue has been cursory. 14 They do not describe
what they mean by reliance, explain why it has jurisprudential
force, or explore how it differs practically from the alternative
approaches to precedent. Instead, they simply add the word
"reliance" to a litany of reasons why precedent should matter.
Consequently, the reliance approach has been undertheorized in
the scholarly literature and applied inconsistently by courts.
This Article fills this lacuna by exploring the reliance approach
to precedent in depth. In doing so, I make the case that reliance
should be the primary factor in deciding whether and when to
adhere to precedent. Importantly, the reliance approach at once
limits and expands our notion of what should "count" as precedent.
First, under this approach, precedent should carry force only when
the public's reliance interests would be substantially undermined
were the court to reject the precedent. In the many cases in which
reliance interests are low or nonexistent, judges may discount
precedent. Simultaneously, though, this approach expands the
universe of precedent. After all, there are other sources and
phenomena that trigger reliance. For example, the decisions of
sister and lower courts may set public behaviors. Further, even
nonjudicial sources such as agency declarations and social
behavior may give rise to legitimate reliance interests in some
cases. If such interests are sufficient to require application of
precedent when the precedential case was issued by the same
court, then they should apply in these cases as well.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the central role
that precedent plays in current legal debates and critically
examines traditional justifications for adherence to precedent.
Part III then introduces the reliance approach as the most
important organizing principle for the doctrine of precedent and
14 As Randy Kozel explains in a forthcoming article that considers other aspects of the
intersection between reliance and precedent, "[flor all its insights, the existing literature on
stare decisis has relatively little to say about the doctrine's function as a mechanism to
protect precedential reliance." Kozel, supranote 13 (manuscript at 9).
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explores its jurisprudential foundations and precursors in the
scholarly and judicial literature. Next, Part IV examines the
implications of the reliance approach by exploring the ways in
which it both limits and expands the kinds of sources that may
qualify as precedent. It also considers how the reliance approach
may be applied in several actual cases. In doing so, Part IV
demonstrates that some aspects of the reliance approach are
implicitly, though only embryonically, manifested in legal
discourse.
Part V then considers possible objections to and problems with
the reliance approach.
Grappling with such objections and
problems helps us to refine the approach and, simultaneously, to
understand both the reluctance of judges and scholars to fully
embrace it and the persistence of a formal approach to precedent.
The Article concludes by suggesting that the reliance approach
demands a revision of conventional wisdom of the nature of legal
doctrine and challenges judges and legal scholars to adopt what I
call a bi-gravitational approach to the law that considers lower
courts, administrative agencies, and public behaviors as sources of
law.

II. PRECEDENT: STAKES AND TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
I begin by briefly reviewing the central role that precedent
plays in judicial and public discourse. 15 I then critically examine
several of the most common justifications for adherence to
precedent.
I argue that these justifications are ultimately
unsatisfactory because they do not account for judicial practice or
the centrality of the doctrine within legal discourse.
A. THE STAKES

Virtually every brief filed before every court cites to and reasons
from precedent. 16 So does every reasoned judicial opinion. 17 And
15 The discussion is brief because, in truth, few law-trained readers require much
convincing for the proposition that precedent is important.
16 Lawson, supra note 1, at 23.
17 Id.
As previously noted, some uses of precedent are beyond the scope of this Article.
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scholarly, political, and public debates on important legal
questions routinely invoke precedent.
This hyper-focus on
precedent reveals a critical point about our legal order: courts,
lawyers, and scholars do not cite to earlier cases merely to forecast
what the Supreme Court will do. Rather, they cite to precedent to
argue what the courts should do. Their argument is that because
a court has done X in a previous case, it should do X (or something
similar to it) in a new case. In other words, the existence of a
precedent is a reason in itself for a court to hold one way or
another.18
Consider, for example, the question whether there is a
constitutional right of access to abortion. When the Supreme
Court confronts a case concerning abortion, the briefs are littered
with references to the leading cases of Roe' 9 and Casey,20 as well as
to other cases more closely on point. For example, in Stenberg v.
Carhart,2' the parties vigorously debated the application of Roe
22
and Casey to Nebraska's so-called partial-birth abortion ban.
23
Subsequently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, relating to a similar
federal ban, the parties argued about the proper application of
Roe, Casey, and Stenberg.24 Similarly, when public and political
These uses involve citations to vertical precedent, which requires a different analysis. See
supra note 13. In most cases, though, citations and arguments appeal to horizontal
precedent. See Lawson, supranote 1, at 23 ("Court [o]pinions ... frequently consist entirely
of discussions of past decisions .... ).
18 Schauer, supra note 1, at 575 (noting an "argument from precedent ... urges that a
decisionmaker give weight to a particular [past decision] regardless of whether that
decisionmaker believes it to be correct").
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21

530 U.S. 914 (2000).

Petitioners argued that both Roe and Casey made clear that the right to abortion is "not
absolute," and women are not entitled to terminate their pregnancies in whatever way they
choose, such that the ban on partial-birth abortion should be upheld. Brief of Petitioners at 8,
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 228613, at *8. Respondents,
meanwhile, argued that the ban "eviscerate[d] the key protections guaranteed to American
women by Roe and Casey." Brief of Respondent at 18, Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 (No. 99-830),
2000 WL 340275, at *18.
22

23

550 U.S. 124 (2007).

Petitioners argued their case was distinguishable from Stenberg, and the ban should be
upheld under the "undue burden" standard for assessing its constitutionality under Roe and
Casey. Brief for the Petitioner at 12-13, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL
24
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discourse turns to abortion, the question of the precedential value
of Roe and Casey often plays a primary role; 25 rarely does a senator
ask a Supreme Court nominee for his or her opinion about when
life begins. Rather, the questioning focuses on the nominee's
26
commitment to precedent with respect to Roe.
The same pattern is apparent in the debates over the
constitutionality of the "Obamacare" individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause. Both sides extensively debated whether and
how previous decisions about the regulatory state applied to the
individual mandate. 2 7 Is a requirement to purchase health
insurance merely one among many laws that punish inactivity by
individuals, 28 or is it unique? 29 Does it affect interstate commerce
the same way as a ban on growing marijuana for personal use, 30 or

1436690, at *12-13. Respondents argued striking down the ban would be consistent with
Stenberg and that case's reading of Roe and Casey. Brief of Respondents at 18-19,
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 2345934, at *18-19.
25 Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Roberts Avoids Specifics on Abortion Issue,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A01; see also Emotions Run High in Alito Hearing's3rd Day,
MSNBC.COM, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10802815/ns/us news-the-chan
ging-court/t/emotions-run-high-alito-hearings-3rd-day/.
26 See Gerhardt, supra note 8,at 1204 (discussing the questioning of John Roberts during
his confirmation hearings).
27 Those in favor of the individual mandate argued it was a valid exercise of Congress's
commerce power, citing cases such as United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), for the
proposition that Congress may regulate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce and arguing that people failing to purchase health insurance distorts interstate
markets for health care. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). Those against the mandate
argued that requiring citizens to buy health insurance was a "wholly novel and potentially
unbounded assertion of congressional authority." Brief for State Respondents at 9, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
28 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 20 (arguing that it has long been
settled that Congress can act preemptively and "need not 'await the disruption
of... commerce'" to exercise its commerce powers).
29 See Brief for State Respondents, supra note 27, at 9 (describing it as "wholly novel").
20 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 21 (analogizing people who do
not purchase insurance to home growers of marijuana for medical use and arguing that, in
the same way Congress can regulate the growers because their marijuana is "never more
than an instant from the interstate market," so too may Congress regulate people who fail
to buy insurance because all people are "'never more than instant' from the "'point of
consumption' of health care" (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1, 40 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment))).
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is it vastly different? 31 In other words, is it unprecedented, or is it,
32
well, precedented?
The list goes on. In debating whether federal law preempts
Arizona's immigration laws, 33 the parties and the courts contested
the applicability of leading preemption cases such as Hines U.
Davidowitz34 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson.35 In the fight over
whether the Constitution requires recognition of same-sex
36
marriage, opponents and proponents fixate on Lawrence v. Texas,
31 See Ilya Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance Case a
Slippery Slope?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 80 (2012) (arguing that "Raich does not
determine the outcome of the mandate case" because "[p]eople without health insurance are
not-by virtue of that status-producing, consuming, or distributing a commodity of any
kind," and thus they do not fit the definition of economic activity relied on by Raich).
32 Compare Randy Barnett, Judicial Minimalism and the Individual Mandate, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 20, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/20/judicial
minimalism-and-the-individual-mandate/ ("If the Supreme Court invalidates the individual
insurance mandate, it need not call into question any other law that has ever been passed
in the history of the United States."), with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at
15-21 (arguing that the mandate was fully in line with established Commerce Clause
precedent).
33 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
34 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
35 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Arizona argued that its laws were not preempted, relying on a
line of cases that says Congress must have clearly intended to preempt state law before a
court can find that it did so. See Brief for Petitioners at 27-28, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(No. 11-182), 2012 WL 416748, at *27-28 ("[C]ourts may not find state measures preempted in the absence of clear evidence that Congress so intended." (quoting California v.
FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497 (1990))); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) ("[I]n
all pre-emption cases.., we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.'" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The United States relied on a
different line of preemption cases to argue that Arizona's attempt to punish violations of
federal law intruded on exclusive federal authority because alien registration is a field
preempted by Congress. See Brief for the United States at 26-27, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *26-27 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 66 (striking down a
state alien-registration statute because federal law created a "complete scheme of
registration" that occupied the field) and Nelson, 250 U.S. at 504 n.21 ("[A]lien registration"
is a field of "dominant federal interest" where "Congress manifestly did not desire
concurrent state action.")).
36 559 U.S. 538 (2003).
Compare Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants' Opening Brief at
112, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-16696), 2010 WL
3762119, at *112 [hereinafter Appellants' Opening Brief] (arguing that Lawrence does not
require the ban on homosexual marriage to be struck down because "Lawrence specifically
said that the case 'did not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.'" (quoting Lawrence, 559 U.S. at
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Romer v. Evans,37 Loving v. Virginia,38 and even Baker v. Nelson,
in which the Court summarily rejected a claim by a same-sex
39
couple for marital recognition.
We would find the same pattern in every case before the
Supreme Court. But why should decisions of the past hold such
sway over the present and future?
B. UNSATISFACTORY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRECEDENT

The topic of precedent has received substantial attention in the
scholarly and judicial literature. 40 Indeed, "[d]ebates about the
role of precedent are as old as precedent itself."41 Here, I briefly
review that literature and show that several conventional theories
of precedent offer unpersuasive justifications, inaccurately
describe judicial practice, or fail to account for why precedent
features so centrally within our legal order.
1. Public Faith in the Judiciary. One justification offered for
the doctrine of precedent is that it promotes public faith in the
judiciary, 42 for if judges routinely changed their minds, the public
578)), with Brief for Appellees at 36, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, 2010 WL 4310749, at *36
(arguing that Lawrence applies to California's ban on gay marriage).
37 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Compare Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 104
(distinguishing Romer), with Brief for Appellees, supra note 36, at 36-37 (arguing that
Romer applies to California's ban on same-sex marriage).
'1 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 51 ("[If there had
been any merit at all in the claim that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to
marry a person of the same sex, then surely the Court would not have dismissed, [Baker v.
Nelson, just five years after Loving,] unanimously, the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question.").
39Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Compare Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 44-45 (arguing Baker mandates
dismissal because "[p]laintiffs assert the same claims as those rejected in Baker"), with
Brief for Appellees, supra note 36, at 35 (arguing Baker is inapplicable because "summary
dismissals are binding on lower courts only 'on the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided' by the Court ...and only to the extent they have not been undermined by
subsequent 'doctrinal developments' in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence" (citations
omitted)).
40 See supra notes 1-11; see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Lecture, Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990).
41 Healy, supra note 1, at 1177.
42 Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 133 (1972)
(arguing stare decisis "provides supportive reassurance to each of the communicator
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would begin to doubt their wisdom, authoritativeness, and
neutrality. Legal pronouncements would cease to be seen as
infallible or "right" and instead would seem arbitrary or
provisional. Worse, judges might come to be viewed merely as
politicians in robes. 43 As a consequence, the judiciary's accepted
role as the final arbiter of "what the law is" 44 would erode. By
deferring to precedent, judges preserve the authority of the judicial
institution, 45 a goal that is more important (in this telling) than
that of correctly resolving the specific legal issue before the court.
As Schauer suggests, courts are able to enhance their credibility
46
and "increase the[ir] power" by adhering to precedent.
The strongest proponent of this view among Supreme Court
Justices has perhaps been Justice Powell, who argued that
"elimination of constitutional stare decisis would represent an
explicit endorsement of the idea that the Constitution is nothing
more than what five Justices say it is."47 It also features heavily in
the plurality opinion in Casey, which reaffirmed the essential
holding of Roe-a constitutional right of access to abortion. As the
plurality suggested, "[tlhe need for principled action to be
perceived as such is implicated to some degree whenever this, or
any other appellate court, overrules a prior case." 48 It went on to
conclude that overruling Roe would inflict a blow to the Court's
49
legitimacy and would contribute to the erosion of its authority.
The trouble with this account is twofold. First, it assumes
without proving that the public has more faith in an institution
that refuses to revisit the mistakes of the past than in one that
tries to correct them. This is a questionable empirical assumption.
As Justice Scalia has argued, "[w]e provide far greater reassurance
decision-makers that his fellows are with his fellows are with him"); Schauer, supra note 1,
at 600.
43 Powell, supra note 40, at 288.
44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
45 See Powell, supra note 40, at 289-90 ("[R]estraint in decisionmaking and respect for
decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an independent judiciary and public
respect for the judiciary's role as a guardian of rights.").
46 Schauer, supra note 1, at 600.
47 Powell, supra note 40, at 288.
48 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992).
49 Id. at 867.
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of the rule of law by eliminating than by retaining [an erroneous
past] decision." 50 Indeed, among those opposed to Roe, continued
adherence to its core holding on the basis of stare decisis surely
does little to fortify their faith in the Court. Likewise, had the
Court in Lawrence v. Texas simply reaffirmed Bowers v. Hardwick
on the ground that it was settled precedent, faith in the Court
would likely not have risen among those who thought Bowers was
wrongly decided. To put a fine point on it, whom would you likely
trust more, the individual who admits to past mistakes or the one
who insists that there have been none? If we justify precedent
because it enhances public faith, then we ought to have some real
evidence for the proposition. Yet we have none.
Second, the public-faith account demands a measure of deceit
on the part of judges. Even the most doctrinaire formalists would
concede that at least some judicial decisions are driven by judges'
ideologies, values, and preferences, or at least that the Court
sometimes gets things wrong. To adopt a judicial doctrine for the
primary purpose of maintaining a public facade of neutrality and
authoritativeness at the expense of righting such wrongs would be
to con the public. 51 The best way to encourage and maintain public
faith in the judiciary is not to trick the public but to demonstrate
honesty and fidelity to the law through careful deliberation and
argumentation.
50 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 A case can be made that judges do and must engage in some behaviors to maintain
public faith in their honesty and fidelity to the law. To be clear, I am not taking a stand
here on this question. I simply acknowledge that (1) there is value in promoting public faith
in the judiciary, (2) this value may sometimes be in tension with the value of honesty, and
(3) a reasonable argument may be made in some circumstances that the need for faithpromotion may trump the value of complete candor. But we ought to at least limit such
practices to procedural mechanisms. For example, judges may wear robes and adopt other
symbols and trappings for the purpose of appearing authoritative and neutral. Judith
Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 383 (1982). Likewise, recusal rules and
practices are meant to reinforce public faith in the judiciary. Indeed, even some core
judicial practices like engaging in oral argument may serve primarily as a public display of
deliberation in those cases in which judges have already made up their minds. But such
procedural practices help to promote public faith at little cost to the integrity of the law's
substance. In contrast, if the substantive doctrine of precedent were to be justified
primarily on the basis of promoting public faith and enhancing the power of the courts, it
would be at the expense of better substantive law. That price is too high.
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2. Judicial Efficiency. A second explanation for the value of
precedent is that it serves the interests of judicial efficiency. In
this telling, judges simply do not have the time or resources to
carefully reconsider each and every previous decision. 52 "It is
simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs all of the
time,"53 and the doctrine of precedent allows judges to conserve
judicial resources rather than to constantly reinvent the wheel.
Although this justification may explain why courts elect not to
rehash and re-reason each and every case from first principles, it
does little to explain why judges who are convinced that an earlier
decision may have been wrong should not reconsider it. Thus, it
provides a descriptive explanation for deference to precedent, but
not the normative justification that the doctrine demands. Of
course, if judges always deferred to precedent, they would achieve
a substantial gain in efficiency. But this does not accurately
describe the practice of deferring to precedent in the courts. The
Supreme Court has never categorically refused to reconsider
precedent.
Everyone agrees that some precedents may be
overturned. 54
But a judge cannot reasonably say, "I am
overturning precedent in case A because the earlier decision was
wrong, but not in case B because doing so is a waste of judicial
resources.
Second, given that the bulk of the analysis in a judicial opinion
often focuses on analogizing to and distinguishing from precedent,
it is not altogether clear that the doctrine of precedent actually
conserves judicial resources. Instead, it may simply shift judges'
work away from reasoning from first principles and toward
reasoning their way through a tangled web of related cases.
If we focus on the Supreme Court, the efficiency justification is
weaker still. In contrast to the federal intermediate appellate

52 Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 102 (1989); Schauer, supranote 1, at 599.
53 Farber, supra note 11, at 1177; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) ("[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case ....
").
54 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("[Wlhen convinced of former error,
this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.").
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courts, which consider tens of thousands of cases each year, 55 the
Supreme Court chooses its own docket and, in the recent past, has
56
elected to shrink its caseload to roughly seventy-five cases a year.
The argument that the Justices' resources are spread too thin to
allow them to consider overturning precedent in at least these
cases rings somewhat hollow. One suspects that they could even
hear a few more cases implicating questionable precedents or, at
the very least, take the necessary time to consider the continued
viability and desirability of earlier decisions in the cases they have
chosen to hear.
Perhaps most importantly, even if the efficiency explanation
does have normative force, it is underwhelming as a justification
for precedent's central role in our legal order. The efficiency
justification proposes that the doctrine of precedent exists because
judges do not have the time or resources to do without it. As such,
precedent is something of a second-best option-a necessary but
not fundamentally desirable feature of our system. If this is true,
then it is a case of the tail wagging the dog, given the doctrine's
prominence in judicial rhetoric and legal discourse.
3. Equality. A third possible justification for adhering to
precedent emerges from the maxim that "like cases should be
treated alike."57 Under this rationale, the courts would violate a
basic rule-of-law principle if, for example, they were to decide on
one day that a person may be executed for committing a particular
crime and then on the next that someone else may not be executed
for committing the same crime. By adhering to precedent, courts
thus help ensure equality. 58 Whereas the first two rationales for
precedent were concerned primarily with the internal functioning

55 U.S. Courts of Appeals (Circuit Courts), THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civ
ilrights.org/judiciary/courts/appeals.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
56Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.
gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
-7 E.g., Schauer, supra note 1, at 595-96.
58 The moral or ethical core of this argument traces back at least as far as Aristotle:
"Equality in morals means this: things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness." ARISTOTLE,
ETHICA NICOMACHEA, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE V.3.1131a-1131b (W.D. Ross ed. &

trans., 1954) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
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and public perception of the courts, the equality justification is
attractive because it offers a strong moral foundation for the
doctrine, suggesting that adhering to precedent produces more just
laws. Unfortunately, the equality justification is also not entirely
persuasive.
First, there is something unsettling about claiming that a court
must affirm what it believes to be a poor past decision in order to
uphold equality. Consider again the case of the death penalty. In
case A, a court held that a particular crime may subject someone
to the death penalty, and that person was subsequently executed.
Later, in case B, the judges are convinced that the Constitution
prohibits execution for the very same crime.
Executing the
defendant in case B simply on the grounds of equality defies sense.
If the equality rationale is to offer any basis for adherence to
precedent, then, it must be refined and cabined. At most, equality
demands that like cases be treated alike unless there is a
nonarbitrary reason to treat them differently. This principle
explains why we should not flip a coin to determine the
punishment for a crime. In contrast, the judges' belief that a
previous decision of the court was incorrect is not arbitrary, and
equality therefore does not demand that courts adhere to
precedent. Alternatively, we may view a judge who declines to
uphold precedent as treating cases A and B fully alike in that the
judge in both cases does the very best to give the Constitution its
59
best interpretation and application.
Second, the equality justification is suspect because it does not
describe reality. Many features of our justice system guarantee
that like cases are often treated unalike, sometimes even for
arbitrary reasons: prosecutorial discretion, 60 economic factors that

59 There is a rich literature on the problems with the "treat like cases alike" approach to
precedent and law more generally. E.g., Schauer, supra note 1, at 595-97; Peter Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974).
60 The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion gives prosecutors substantial leeway in
deciding when and how to charge a defendant, as well as whether to offer plea agreements.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 124 (1979). As a practical matter, this means that two people who commit the same
crime may be treated differently by prosecutors.
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allow some to afford excellent lawyers and others to afford poor
lawyers, 6 1 differences between juries, 62 different practices among
judges, 63 and so on. If the equality argument is taken seriously,
why does it not apply in these areas?
Finally, if equality concerns animated the doctrine of precedent,
then this principle would also substantially constrain a
legislature's ability to change the law. That is, the equality
argument offers no reason for treating courts and legislatures
differently; if it is wrong for courts to change the law such that it
would apply unequally in similar cases, then it is also wrong for
the legislature to do so. Yet no one argues that legislatures must
adhere to their own precedents, and there would surely be no
equality-based objection to the legislature abolishing the death
penalty simply because previous legislatures established it. Any
normative justification for the doctrine of precedent must offer a
basis for distinguishing between courts and legislatures, but the
equality argument appears to offer none.
4.
Super-Strong Precedent in the Statutory Context.
Traditionally, courts have given even greater deference to
precedents concerning questions of statutory interpretation and
application than they have to constitutional and common law
precedents. 64 The justification for this "super-strong" statutory
precedent rule 65 is that legislative silence suggests acquiescence to
a court's interpretation of a statute, or even that the legislature
66
agrees that the court's interpretation of the statute was correct.
As Guido Calabresi put it, "[w]hen a court says to a legislature:

61

See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING

QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_a

id indigent defense systems imprisonment/gideons-brokenpromise.html.
62 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) ("[T]he inherent lack of
predictability of jury decisions does not justify their condemnation ....Apparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.").
63 See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940 U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND

JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281794.pdf.
6 Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1365,
65 The term comes from Eskridge. Id. at 1366.
66 Id. at 1366-67; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
31-32 (1982).
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'You (or your predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the
legislature to answer: 'We did not.' 67
This justification, too, has limitations. Most obviously, it only
explains why judges should defer to precedent in the statutory
context; it has nothing at all to say about precedent's value in
nonstatutory cases. This is not a critique of the justification,
which after all has no broader ambitions. But precedent is a much
more expansive jurisprudential principle, not confined to the
statutory context. Indeed, the judicial and scholarly literature on
precedent typically focuses on the constitutional context. 6 Thus,
even if we were to accept the legislative-acquiescence justification
for precedent, we would not succeed in explaining the importance
of precedent as a foundational principle in the law.
We must also narrow the potential applicability of this
justification even further, for it can only reasonably apply to
statutory precedents from the Supreme Court. Congress typically
is oblivious to lower-court opinions, which receive little media
attention, and thus has no real opportunity to override such
opinions legislatively, 69 and it rarely responds to opinions issued
by the federal appellate courts. 70 Therefore, with respect to such
decisions, the legislative-acquiescence argument carries little
force.
There are also good reasons to be skeptical that the possibility
of legislative override provides a reasonable justification even
when appropriately limited. Although Congress sometimes does
respond to statutory decisions issued by the Supreme Court, there
67 CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 31-32. For related reasons, it has also been suggested
that the availability of congressional override in the statutory context mitigates
countermajoritarian concerns. E.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case
for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 204 (1989); Deborah
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of
CongressionalOverrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 519-21 (2009).
68 See generally Randy E. Barnett, Response, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super
Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006); Schauer,
supra note 1.
69 Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 331 (2005)
70 Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit
Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE, no. 2, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 61.
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are many reasons that it may not do so even if a particular opinion
was incorrect. 71 Given the series of "vetogates" that a bill must
pass through to become law, it is implausible to expect Congress to
consistently override incorrect judicial opinions.7 2
Similarly,
legislative priorities and political factors may be such that
Congress cannot fix the Court's errors.7 3 Indeed, the legislators
who enacted the initial statute that was wrongly interpreted may
have been replaced with legislators for whom the issue in question
ranks low in priority or who prefer the policy produced by the
Court's decision, even if the decision was a poor interpretation of
the statute in question.7 4 Given that legislative inaction does not
provide strong evidence of the meaning of the statute or the
current legislature's preferences, it is a dubious business to adhere
to precedent simply because congressional override is theoretically
available.7 5 It is perhaps for these reasons that the super-strong
76
statutory precedent rule has eroded in recent years.

71 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the assumption the Court's decision is correct because Congress fails to pass
legislation rejecting it is based on false premises); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1409
(arguing that the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedent should
be abandoned).
72 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444-48 (2008).
73 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne must ignore rudimentary
principles of political science to draw any conclusions regarding [the current Congress's]
intent from the failure to enact legislation."); Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1405 ("The vagaries
of the political process make it hard to determine what Congress' 'positive inaction'
meant.").
74 Additionally, Justice Scalia and others have argued that subsequent legislative action
or inaction is irrelevant to a statute's meaning. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1405 n.215.
75 There may be specific cases in which subsequent action or inaction by the legislature
does provide relatively strong evidence of legislative acquiescence, for example if Congress
has a clear opportunity to respond to the Court's decision but declines to do so, such as
when it reenacts the statute with changes or when it enacts a related statute with the same
language. In such cases, it would be sensible to reaffirm the earlier decision. But this
requires careful case-specific analysis and would not support a general presumption in favor
of precedent even in the narrow category of cases that we have already identified. Thus, in
order to make sense of the super-strong presumption of statutory stare decisis, we must
define the class of cases to which it reasonably applies so narrowly that the "rule" ceases to

be of much use.
76 Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1369.
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Finally, as scholars have shown, the legislative-acquiescence
argument is problematic because even when Congress does
override an earlier decision of the Court, subsequent judicial
rulings tend to construe such overrides narrowly, seeking to
preserve as much of the supposedly overridden precedent as
possible-and more than may be reasonable. 77 There are different
reasons for this. First, drafting and passing a legislative override
is no simple task. How narrow or broad should the override be?
Should the override respond to and "fix" the Court's broad
jurisprudence in the relevant area in order to create a consistent
and coherent legal landscape, or should it focus only on the case
itself and let the courts sort out the inconsistencies and anomalies
that may result? 78 Faced with these questions, legislators produce
statutory overrides that introduce new questions and vagueness
into the law. 79 Second, when lower courts face the resulting
questions, they must reconcile the new legislative enactments with
any part of the precedential opinion and related opinions from the
Supreme Court that have not been explicitly overridden.8 0 Lower
courts typically end up preserving more of the overridden
precedents than Congress intended or expected. 8 ' This pattern
undermines the argument for heightened deference to statutory
precedent, which assumes that Congress can readily "undo"
precedents of which it disapproves.
III. THE RELIANCE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT
There is an alternative justification for adhering to precedent
that offers a far stronger descriptive and normative account of the
doctrine, which I call the reliance approach. According to this
approach, courts should defer to their precedents in order to avoid
77 Widiss, supra note 67, at 531-34.

Id. at 517 (arguing that Congress should strive to clarify the extent to which it
disagrees with a prior judicial interpretation, while courts should "recognize that in
enacting an override, Congress has the power to reinterpret the preexisting statutory
language as well as to add new statutory language").
79 Id. at 514-15.
78

0 Id.
81 Id.
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undermining the reliance interests that the public has justifiably
developed based on those precedents. In this Part, I introduce this
approach by relating the core function of the courts to the doctrine
of precedent.
I then suggest that the relative institutional
competencies of the judiciary and the legislature explain why the
former should defer to precedent while the latter is free to reject it.
Finally, I show that several leading scholars and judges have
anticipated the reliance approach or offered related accounts, but
or
that previous treatments have not comprehensively
and
explored
the approach's justifications
convincingly
implications.
A. THE CORE FUNCTION OF LAW AND COURTS

A basic function of law and judicial opinions is to allow
members of society to predict the future, thereby guiding them on
how to order their lives.8 2 That is, law and judicial opinions
generate understanding on the part of the governed-including
private citizens, organizations, and public officials and bodies-as
to what is required of them, how they may (or must) act, and how
to avoid and resolve disputes. When members of society take
action based on understandings generated from judicial opinions,
those decisions generate reliance interests.
Judges, like other lawmakers, consequently exert substantial
control over our lives, as their opinions require or encourage us to
make critical and often costly investments-of money, time, talent,
and other resources-that we otherwise would not have made.
But this power and the benefits it provides come at a price: courts
must constrain themselves to adhere to their opinions. Otherwise,
judicial opinions lose their predictive power, and we would be
justified in discounting them in deciding how to act. The central
function of precedent, then, is that it protects the legitimate
reliance interests of the public, and if we wish for judicial opinions
to affect parties other than those in the specific case being decided,
then we must insist on the doctrine of precedent. 83 In this way, a
S2 Schauer, supra note 1, at 597.
83

See Max Mizner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due
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core function of the courts depends on the doctrine of precedent,
and this is why precedent is a central organizing feature of our
legal order.
What this means in practical terms is that even when judges
believe that an earlier case was wrongly decided, they must
discipline themselves to adhere to the principles announced in that
case, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Naturally,
judges may be tempted to adhere to precedent as a general rule
but to reject it in what they view to be particularly egregious
cases. They might intuit, even correctly, that such limited and
judicious rejections of precedent would not cause our legal order to
collapse. But such departures from precedent would still raise
moral concerns: if people have justifiably relied on past judicial
decisions to their detriment, then their reliance interests would be
undermined and the investments they made as a result of such
judicial guidance would be jeopardized. As we have seen, by
adhering to precedent, judges induce-indeed, force-the public to
act in reliance on judicial pronouncements. For a judge to then
turn around and frustrate those reliance interests would be like
committing a sort of fraud. In this way, the doctrine of precedent
may be best understood as akin to promissory estoppel in contract
4
law.8
To concretize the argument, consider my mother's approaching
retirement.8 5 For the past several years, she has paid money into
the Social Security system and invested in retirement accounts.
Having done so, she has spent the bulk of her life secure in the
knowledge that she has prepared for retirement (recognizing, of
course, that some basic risks exist in any investing strategy). This
has allowed her to plan her life and caused her to spend her
nonretirement funds in any number of ways. As she approaches
retirement, she reasonably assumes she will have resources
Process, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 621 ('We accept the impact on third parties as part of the
effort to create legal rules on which people can rely.").
84 Estoppel means (1) there is "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or third person" and (2) "which
does induce such action or forbearance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1981).
85 Alas, I do not know how to cite to my mother's retirement planning.
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available to her from the Social Security system and from her
retirement accounts. A primary reason that my mother has been
able to organize her life in this way is that she has (albeit
unbeknownst to her) relied on various Supreme Court decisions
that allowed Congress to institute the Social Security system and
permitted financial markets to develop in a way that makes
86
investments in retirement accounts possible.
Suppose that each of our contemporary Supreme Court Justices
believes that these earlier decisions were wrong. Assume, too,
that every legal scholar in the nation agrees with them. In other
words, the strongest case possible can be made that the precedents
lack merit. Under these circumstances, the Court may be inclined
to overturn these precedents should appropriate cases raising the
issues present themselves. But what would happen if the Court
did so? In a word, chaos. My mother's years of careful planning,
career decisions, financial choices, and reasonable expectations
about the future would be nullified in an instant. Could she retire
when she planned? Could she ever retire? Are her investments
worthless? Does she even still have a bank account? Can she buy
food tomorrow? Can anyone? And this chaos would be the Court's
fault.
In short, the most fundamental reason that precedent matters
is that people reasonably rely on the courts and order their affairs
accordingly. It would be immoral for the courts to say "oops,"
claim a do-over, and then do violence to those people whose actions
87
have been induced by the courts themselves.

8 See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act);
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (upholding the constitutionality of paper
money).
87 It is impossible to consider the question of precedent without confronting Casey and
Roe, the cases that focused scholarly and public attention on the precedent question to a
greater degree than any others.
The plurality in Casey addressed the reliance value of Roe. It first considered several
ways in which Roe did not induce reliance on the part of the public:
Abortion is customarily chosen as an unplanned response to the
consequence of unplanned activity or to the failure of conventional birth
control, and except on the assumption that no intercourse would have
occurred but for Roe's holding, such behavior may appear to justify no
reliance claim. Even if reliance could be claimed on that unrealistic

2013]

A RELIANCE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT

1057

B. RELATIVE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCIES

Any credible justification for the doctrine of precedent must
distinguish between courts and legislatures. That is, to be
persuasive, a rationale must account for why a court should defer
to its precedents but a legislature is free to reject its earlier laws.8 8
At first glance, this requirement appears to challenge the reliance
approach. After all, people surely organize their lives around
statutory law to at least as great a degree as they do around
judicial precedents. If, as I have argued, the morality of a legal
assumption, the argument might run, any reliance interest would be de
minimis.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (plurality opinion).
However, the plurality ultimately rejected this view on the grounds that
for two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of women
to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.
Id. at 856.
The best way to conceptualize these arguments is to ask what would happen if Roe and
Casey were overturned tomorrow.
Most obviously and immediately, those medical
professionals who have devoted their medical practices to providing access to safe and legal
abortions would find their reliance interests undermined (though they may be able to
provide other healthcare services to women). Likewise, women who became pregnant
before the Court overturned Roe and Casey could reasonably argue that their sexual
practices and birth control choices were made with the assumption that abortion services
would be available to them.
More broadly, however, we would need to consider the extent to which women (and
men) have organized their lives and livelihood around the assumption that access to
abortion would be available to them. Specifically, have they invested in their education,
relationships, and careers in ways that would have been different had Roe been decided
differently, much like my mother relies on the Social Security system? This is what the
plurality seems to argue, albeit vaguely, and this is what should control the question.
My intuition is that different people-including different judges and scholars-will
assess the reliance interests differently. But this question is amenable to careful empirical
inquiry, and even if such inquiry would not fully resolve the matter, applying the reliance
lens allows us to identify the relevant questions and to channel the judicial inquiry and the
locus of judicial judgment to this common ground.
Finally, it is possible that as the Supreme Court's protection of abortion rights appears
to erode, and as states impose increasingly restrictive laws on the availability of abortion
services, we may experience a shift in the public's reliance-based investment on the
continued vitality of Roe and Case. See infra Part V.A and note 243.
88 See supraPart II.B.3.
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system demands that people's reliance interests be protected, then
why is a legislature free to change the law as it sees fit? The
answer to this question lies in the relative institutional
competencies and capabilities of courts and legislatures.
Judges are often poorly situated to mitigate the effects of any
reliance interests that have accrued due to their passed
decisions.8 9 Consider again Social Security. If the Supreme Court
were faced with a constitutional challenge to the Social Security
system, the Justices' choice would be binary: uphold the Social
Security system or strike it down as unconstitutional. If they were
to strike it down, there is little they could do to mitigate the
chaotic effects of the decision. They could not, for example, phase
out Social Security over a number of years, slowly raise and then
eliminate the retirement age, or ensure that those who have paid
in will be able to participate in Social Security and only eliminate
it for those who have not yet participated. 90 The Constitution does
not grant courts these policymaking powers, and they lack the
democratic pedigree to wield them.
But let us even assume that the Court could institute such
policymaking measures that would mitigate the chaotic effects of
such a ruling. 91 Even so, they are ill-suited to the task. Courts
typically focus on very specific legal questions and very specific
facts from the past; it is beyond their brief and ability to anticipate

89 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 20-21) ('The Supreme Court's powers to
deal with legal change are limited. The Court cannot go ahead with overturning a
precedent but order that the gains resulting from the reversal be divvied equally among the
winners and losers. Nor can it depend on those who benefit from legal changes to make
voluntary payments to the losers in order to dull the sting. Prospective overruling is a
potential middle ground, but the Court has recently expressed disfavor for that approach.
And even prospective overruling is an incomplete tool, providing little help to those who
have made forward-looking investments on the assumption that a certain legal rule will
remain binding into the future." (footnotes omitted)).
90 See infra note 93.
I1 Some Justices have attempted to do so in rare cases. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (announcing a sort of Court-imposed sunset provision for raceconscious admissions programs); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (clarifying that the
decision applies only to the facts at hand); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should overrule its precedent but make
the decision apply prospectively). All of these are attempts to ameliorate the mischief that
a decision may cause and to allow people to plan accordingly.

2013]

A RELIANCE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT

1059

all of the ways in which a rejection of precedent may create waves
in the law and undermine reliance interests. Further, even if they
could make such predictions, courts-particularly appellate
courts-do not have the ability to call witnesses to provide
testimony as to how it may effectively craft a policy that would
mitigate the effects of the ruling, and they have no basis for
evaluating such arguments. And even if they were open to doing
so, given the distinctive position of the courts as being responsive
to cases and controversies, they may have little opportunity to
revise the policies they mandate should experience prove them
unwise or unworkable.
In contrast, the legislature is well positioned for these tasks.
The job of the legislature is to create forward-looking laws. To do
so, legislators have many tools at their disposal, including the
ability to deliberate for as long as they wish, to consider testimony
from those with expertise, to introduce comprehensive legal
frameworks, and to revisit and adjust laws as necessary.
Additionally, legislators are democratically accountable and
therefore face political constraints on their ability to pass laws
that would substantially undermine the reliance interests of the
public. Further, the Framers made it difficult even for the
legislature to pass new laws precisely because they wanted to
foster social stability and thus to protect reliance interests. 92 It is
no surprise, therefore, that all legislative proposals to modify the
Social Security system-even those that call for the most radical
transformations-include mechanisms to protect the reliance
93
interests of those who have acted in reliance on the status quo.
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 379 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ('The
internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of
liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their
own choice, if the laws.., undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what
the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow.").
93 Leading proposals from both sides of the political aisle recognize the importance of
reliance interests. See, e.g., THE HERITAGE FOUND., SAVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE

HERITAGE PLAN TO FIX THE DEBT, CUT SPENDING, AND RESTORE PROSPERITY 7-13 (Stuart M.

Butler et al. eds., 2011), http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/srOO91.pdf (arguing for
a solution that takes into account both "promises past Congresses have made" to current
generations and also "the consequences their children and grandchildren will suffer if these
promised benefits remain untouched," to develop a "[piredictable [blenefit [t]hat [p]rovides
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Thus, unlike the courts, the legislature is unlikely to wholly
upset reliance interests, and it has the tools necessary to craft
policies that mitigate the costs of radical policy changes. In short,
the Legislature need not adhere to precedent because it has
other-better-ways of accounting for, and constraints on its
ability to upset, reliance interests. 94 For courts, the doctrine of
precedent provides the central mechanism for protecting these
interests.
C. SCHOLARLY AND JUDICIAL PRECURSORS

The reliance approach is not entirely novel. Judges and
scholars have alluded to related principles, though they have
never offered a sustained account of or consistently applied a
reliance approach.
Likewise, scholars and judges have not
explored the moral and jurisprudential foundations of this
approach, nor have they taken it seriously enough to trace its
implications and how they differ from the implications of
alternative justifications for precedent.
In other words, the
reliance approach finds latent support and antecedents within
legal discourse, but judicial and scholarly treatment of the subject
is far from complete.
Perhaps the Supreme Court case that best expresses the
reliance approach is United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,
in which the United States sued on behalf of Native Americans
claiming land rights. 95 Without considering the substantive merits
of the case, the Court affirmed an earlier precedent:
The [earlier] decision was given twenty-three years
ago and affected many tracts of land .... In the

[e]conomic [s]ecurity'); GENE SPERLING, A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM 4 (2005) (on file with author) (arguing that any Social Security reform must start

from a place of protecting retirement security).
9 A difficult question arises when legislatures do not use the tools at their disposal to
protect reliance interests. For example, consider the possibility that the legislature may
institute new taxes that have retroactive effect, thereby frustrating reliance interests. Is this
acceptable behavior? I leave this as an open question that requires further consideration.
95 265 U.S. 472, 481 (1924).
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meantime there has been a continuous growth and
development in that section, land values have
enhanced, and there have been many transfers.
the
on
reliance
there has been
Naturally
decision.... It has become a rule of property, and to
disturb it now would be fraught with many injurious
96
results.
This case captures the reliance approach to precedent fairly well;
its thrust is that it is problematic for courts to undo decisions that
others have reasonably relied upon and invested heavily in as a
result.
97
Unfortunately, this case and others that share its orientation
have not become a touchstone for courts in deciding whether to
adhere to precedent. Judicial citations to this case usually have
nothing to do with precedent; 98 those that do cite it as offering a
justification for adhering to precedent usually relate specifically to
the field of property law; 99 when it is cited as a broader principle
justifying adherence to precedent, it is typically offered as simply
one among several reasons for doing so;100 its foundational
96 Id. at 486. The Court went on to eloquently describe one of the differences between
courts and legislatures' ability to resolve problems such as these:
Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect
the future only; but where courts vacillate, and overrule their own decisions
on the construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their
decisions are retrospective and may affect titles purchased on the faith of
their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once
decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.
Id. at 486-87 (internal quotation mark omitted).
97 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (citing
reliance in affirming precedent); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-75
(1989) (same); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984)
(same).
91 A Westlaw search reveals that this case has been cited roughly 100 times in other
cases, and roughly fifty times in scholarly literature, though most of these citations do not
relate to the issue of precedent but rather to other, unrelated aspects of the case.
99 E.g., Sum ma Corp., 466 U.S. at 208-09.
100 A typical "examination" of the application of precedent featuring Title Insurancelooks
like this:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance
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jurisprudential justifications have never been explored; and its
broader implications are never considered. In other words, the
case law has identified the significance of reliance in the law of
precedent but has not internalized its principles or applied it in a
consistent or considered way.
The bulk of the scholarship relating to the reliance approach is
likewise embryonic and thus incomplete. 1°1 For example, Michael
Gerhardt argues that some precedents have attained the status of
"super precedent." This category, he says, includes
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266
(1986). Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
it be settled right." [sic] Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, when governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944). Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision."
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). This is particularly true in
constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative
action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra,
at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where
reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111,
116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 405-411
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S.
472 (1924); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458 (1852); the
opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and
evidentiary rules.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (citations and alterations in original).
101 A thoughtful discussion of the Title Insurance case and its implications is featured in
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REv. 643, 661-63 (2000). Lee develops an
economic model for deciding when precedent ought to bind courts, focusing on the costs
imposed by deviation from precedent. He suggests that precedents concerning property
ownership are especially strong because of the nature of the reliance interests that ensue. I
am not certain that this particular conclusion is warranted, but the article is provocative
and touches on themes explored herein. Lee's article, however, limits itself (by design) to an
economic consideration of the value of precedent and does not explore the ways in which
these economic concerns relate to the judicial role. Likewise, he does not extend his
analysis beyond the prototypical case of horizontal precedent. This is not meant to criticize
Lee's article, which cogently mines some of the same ground as mine. I mean only to
suggest that Lee's approach and interests lie in a different arena from mine.
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those constitutional decisions in which public
institutions have heavily invested, repeatedly relied,
and consistently supported over a significant period of
time. Super precedents are deeply embedded into our
law and lives through the subsequent activities of the
other branches .... Super precedents are the clearest
instances in which the institutional values promoted
by fidelity to precedent-consistency,
stability,
predictability, and social reliance-have become
02
irredeemably compelling.1
Similarly, Daniel Farber suggests that "bedrock precedents"
should be retained to achieve the "stable framework for
government" that a constitution is designed to establish. 1 3 He
describes precedents that upheld the constitutionality of New Deal
reforms, tax and spending programs, federal control of the
economy, and administrative agencies, as well as rulings that
incorporated the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment
and mandated desegregation, as "omelettes [that] cannot be
unscrambled today"'1 4 because trying to do so would lead to "the
kind of uncertainty and instability that constitutions.. . are
designed to avoid."'10 5
The theory of precedent advanced by Gerhardt and Farber
resonates with but does not perfectly replicate the reliance
approach.
For instance, Gerhardt and Farber privilege
constitutional precedents over common law and statutory
precedents, 10 6 whereas the reliance approach does not; after all,
the public's reliance interests do not necessarily track the category
of precedent. 10 7 Relatedly, Gerhardt and Farber only begin to
102Gerhardt, supra note 8,at 1205-06.
103 Farber, supra note 11, at 1180.
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1180; Gerhardt, supra note 8,at 1205.
It is not clear why Gerhardt and Farber seem to believe that constitutional precedents

deserve privileged status. Indeed, as Eskridge and Ferejohn argue, in today's society,
statutes are a more central and robust source of public policy than is the Constitution. See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).
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explore the implications of their approaches-finding some famous
constitutional cases qualify as super or bedrock precedents and
others do not' 0 8-without considering more nuanced applications
of their central insight. Finally, their arguments do not explain
why the judicial and legislative treatments of precedent should
differ.
All of these deficits stem from a failure to explore the
jurisprudential foundations of their approach. Indeed, to the
extent that they do reflect on the deep values that operate in this
area, they miss important features of the reliance approach.
Gerhardt considers cases to be super precedents when other
branches of government invest and rely on them, 10 9 and Farber
considers cases to be bedrock cases when they stabilize
government institutions. 110 In contrast, the reliance approach
focuses primarily on the public's investment in a decision. Even
so, Gerhardt and Farber's focus on principles like stability and
reliance is shared by the reliance approach.
Perhaps the most important contribution to the literature
concerning the intersection between reliance and precedent is
Randy Kozel's forthcoming article, Precedent and Reliance."'
Kozel likewise finds the literature concerning reliance
undertheorized" 12 and suggests that there is an abiding tension
between the Supreme Court's rhetorical commitment to the
reliance-protecting and stability-inducing aspects of deference to
precedent and its repeated admonition that precedent does not
actually operate to bind courts and is not "an inexorable command"
or "a promise."" 3 As a result of this tension, Kozel suggests that
108 Gerhardt discusses several well-known cases that he considers to be super precedent,
such as Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), a case that upheld the constitutionality of
paper money, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), a
separation of powers decision, while also mentioning several famous cases that he does not
believe fully qualify as super precedent, such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
and Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942). Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 1213-19.
109

Id. at 1205.

110 Farber, supra note 11, at 1180.
M Kozel, supranote 13.
112 Id. (manuscript at 9-10).
113Id. (manuscript at 2). Kozel poignantly quotes Brandeis's famous statement that "in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be
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protecting those who relied on earlier decisions is fundamentally
not the justification for the doctrine of precedent. Rather, he
suggests that precedent simply "operates as a buffer against
dramatic change, nothing more and nothing less," and that "[t]he
concept of reliance serves as a proxy for the disruption likely to
14
attend a judicial overruling."'
While Kozel's approach shares much with mine, ultimately our
projects are different. Whereas he essentially rejects reliance
interests as a justification for deference to precedent in light of the
Court's inconsistency in adhering to precedent, I steadfastly
maintain that traditional reliance interests must be the core of
precedent doctrine in order to protect the judiciary's moral
standing. 115 To the extent the Supreme Court has rejected
precedent, I suggest that it has done so because reliance interests
are (1) either not present or are outweighed by other factors 1 6 or
(2) precisely because reliance has been undertheorized and not
fully internalized by judges as a basis for precedent. Further, like
most scholars, Kozel limits his study to the Supreme Court. In
contrast, I consider the operation of the reliance approach in lower
courts and its vast implications for other actors in the legal
system.
In addition to legal scholars like Farber, Gerhardt, and Kozel,
philosophers as disparate as F.A. Hayek, Joseph Raz, Lon Fuller,
and John Rawls have also identified the critical role that public
certainty, expectations, and reliance concerning the law play in the

settled right," and simultaneously notes that Brandeis insisted that the Court must
overturn some kinds of precedent. Id. (manuscript at 4). Kozel goes on to demonstrate just
how inconsistent the Court has been on this score. See id. (manuscript at 12) (noting the
Court's "pronounced ambivalence").
114 Id. (manuscript at 19).
115 Further, it is unclear to me why Kozel insists that a tension within a doctrine is reason
to discount it. Legal doctrine is full of balancing tests that feature embedded tensions.
Different judges may come to different conclusions about the appropriate balance and thus
vote differently, but that does not devalue the test, which still performs the important
function of identifying the relevant considerations and channeling the task of judging onto
agreed-upon grounds.
116 I explore such cases in Part IV.A.1-2, infra. In short, one reason that Courts may
decline to adhere to precedent is that reliance has been negligible. Under the reliance
approach, this is fully justified.
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development of a just legal order. For example, Hayek--ever the
libertarian and therefore attuned to the interests of the
individual-maintained that "[s]tripped of all technicalities, [the
rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound
by... rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of
117
this knowledge."
Like Hayek, Rawls viewed this rule-of-law principle as "closely
related to liberty."118
A legal system can only be just, he
suggested, when it "establish[es] a basis for legitimate
expectations... [and] constitute[s] grounds upon which persons
can rely on one another and rightly object when their expectations
are not fulfilled."1 19 Further, if rules are unstable or unclear, "the
boundaries of men's liberties" are unsure,1 20 and "the citizen does
not know how he is to behave."' 2'
Fuller also identified
predictability and stability as central to a just legal system.' 22 He
went so far as to argue that a system that fails to meet these
128
requirements "is not properly called a legal system at all."'
Although Raz stressed that strict or perfect adherence to
Hayek's (and by implication Rawls's and Fuller's) vision of the rule
of law is impossible and, indeed, sometimes undesirable in light of
competing values, 124 he too emphasized reliance-related values,
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (fiftieth anniversary ed. 1994) (1944).
118 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (rev. ed. 2000) (1971).
117

119
120

121

Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.

122 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (1964).
Fuller famously
identified eight features that would render a legal system immoral. These are (1)
inconsistent adjudication due to the lack of law; (2) "failure to publicize" the law; (3)
retroactive laws; (4) lack of clarity in the law; (5) contradictory laws; (6) legal duties that
the regulated community cannot comply with; (7) lack of stability in the law due to constant
revision; and (8) inconsistent application and interpretation of the law. Id. These elements
of a moral legal order all share in common that they impose predictability on the law and
thereby generate public expectations and allow people to rely on the law.
123

Id.

124

JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 228 (1979)

(arguing, contra Hayek, that "the rule of law is just one of the virtues that law should
possess ... [and] [i]t has always to be balanced against competing claims of other values").

20131

A RELIANCE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT

1067

agreeing that "people need to know the law not only for short-term
decisions.., but also for long-term planning.... Stability [in the
law] is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long125
term decisions."
None of these thinkers has explicitly linked reliance with
precedent, but the implications are clear. Indeed, their writings
signal that precedent is not merely a single doctrine within the
law-one among many-but rather is a singulardoctrine that goes
to the heart of law's morality and claim to justice. This is so
precisely because adherence to precedent stands at the center of a
legal order that protects, and thus facilitates, reliance. More so
than the other justifications for precedent, then, the reliance
approach to precedent explains why precedent features so heavily
in legal discourse.
In sum, although the reliance approach to precedent has never
been fully developed or consistently applied by judges or scholars,
it finds powerful-if inchoate-support within the judicial and
scholarly conception of just and moral law.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS: LIMITING AND EXPANDING PRECEDENT

Thus far, I have introduced and developed the jurisprudential
basis for the reliance approach to precedent. In this Part, I
examine the far-reaching implications of this approach. I first
consider some of the ways in which it limits the universe of cases
that ought to be considered as having precedential value. I then
consider how the reliance approach radically expands the kinds of
sources that we ought to consider as precedent. I also identify
several ways in which the current doctrine concerning precedent
has embedded elements of the reliance principles, but only in
embryonic form. Thus, close inspection reveals that the reliance
approach has both descriptive and normative power.

125

Id. at 214-15.
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A. LIMITING PRECEDENT

Despite its fundamental and powerful moral imperative, the
reliance approach suggests certain limits on precedent's reach and
force. Specifically, some kinds of judicial decisions should be
viewed as nonprecedential altogether, while others should be seen
as having limited precedential value. In the former set of cases,
judges should be free to discount previous decisions if they are
convinced that the cases were wrongly decided. In the latter,
judges should place less value on precedent-based arguments.
Thus, in contrast to the alternative approaches to precedent, the
reliance approach substantially limits the universe of cases that
should be considered as precedential.
Simply stated, courts should not defer to precedents that do not
give rise to substantial reliance interests. Judges should thus
apply a sort of reliance test to determine whether a case should be
viewed as having presumptive precedential force. If rejecting that
case would not frustrate substantial reliance interests among the
public, then judges are free to do so. I identify three categories in
which precedential force should be denied or limited.
1. Category 1: Cases That Cannot Generate Reliance Interests.
Some cases that should lack precedential force are easy to spot
because they are not the kinds of cases that induce reliance. For
example, the majority in the Heller gun-rights case correctly
rejected the argument that it should adhere, simply on the
grounds of precedent, to the pronouncement in the 1939 case
United States v. Miller126 that the Second Amendment does not
protect individual gun ownership rights. 127 After all, it is difficult
to identify any group of people who had in any meaningful sense
organized their lives around the Miller decision. There were
surely those who were disappointedby the Miller decision and who
would have, in its absence, chosen to possess weapons. But by

126
127

307 U.S. 174 (1939).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008). To clarify, I do not here take a

stand on whether the majority in Heller correctly interpreted the Second Amendment. I
mean only to say that the existence of the earlier Miller decision was not, in itself, a
substantive reason to rule one way or another.

2013]

A RELIANCE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT

1069

allowing greater gun rights in Heller, the Court did not reorder
social arrangements or meaningfully disrupt reliance interests. 128
A similar pattern (notably from the other side of the proverbial
political aisle) is presented by Lawrence v. Texas, which
overturned the earlier decision of Bowers v. Hardwick.129 Bowers
had held that a state law penalizing sodomy did not run afoul of
substantive due process. 130 As with Miller, it is hard to envision
how people had organized their lives around Bowers in a manner
with which Lawrence interfered. Even those (if there were any)
who organized their sexual lives in keeping with antisodomy laws
did not have anything meaningfully invested in the decision; they
were now simply free to consider expanding their sexual practices.
Thus, when faced with the opportunity to reconsider the question
in Lawrence, the Court reasonably dispensed with precedent and
13 1
reasoned through the question substantively.
Consider also one of the hot-button issues of the moment, the
battle over same-sex marriage. 132 In the 1971 case Baker v.
Nelson, the Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial
128

Indeed, to the chagrin of many gun-rights advocates, the Court was particularly

careful not to open the doors to a wholesale assault on gun-control laws. In the course of its
opinion, the Court went beyond the facts of the Heller case and stated that its ruling would
not interfere with many restrictions on gun ownership. Id. at 626-27. One way to
understand this statement is that, consistent with the reliance interests animating the
doctrine of precedent, the Court was concerned about the potential of its opinion to create
chaos in the lower courts.
129 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986).
130 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
131 One might argue that Justice O'Connor's equal-protection-based concurrence in
Lawrence provided an even better basis for the decision under a reliance approach to
precedent, for two reasons. First, Justice O'Connor's concurrence would not have directly
overturned Bowers because it was limited to laws that treated sexual acts between
members of the same sex differently from those between members of the opposite sex. 539
U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Second, the novel principle
articulated by Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion that moral beliefs alone are not
sufficient to serve as a rational basis for a law may have unforeseen consequences on a host
of other laws, as Justice Scalia's dissent argued. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As such,
Justice Kennedy's opinion may interfere with reliance interests in other areas of the law.

Justice O'Connor's concurrence does not have the same reach.
132 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), grantingcert., Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), granting cert.,
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
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federal question a challenge to a Minnesota law that limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples. 133 In recent years, the courts
have begun to consider new challenges to such laws.134 If the
Supreme Court decides this issue in Perry or Windsor, one
question will be whether the Justices should adhere to Baker on
account of precedent. 135 The reliance approach suggests they
should not. As with Miller and Bowers, a great many people have
been affected by the Court's decision in Baker: same-sex couples
who want to marry cannot, political discourse has organized itself
around the debate over same-sex marriage, and, of course, those
who oppose same-sex marriage would be disappointed if Baker
were rejected in the future. But it is difficult to see how the Court
rejecting Baker would impose new costs on society beyond those
associated with simple disagreement--costs that will be incurred
however the Court rules in Perry and Windsor and regardless of
whether Baker had ever existed. 36 As such, the existence of the
Baker decision provides no independent basis for the Court to
reject challenges by advocates of same-sex marriage, and the
Court should accord no precedential weight to it. Instead, it
should decide these cases purely on their constitutional merits.
Collectively, these examples suggest that the reliance approach
to precedent tends to allow the Court to increase its protection of

133 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
134 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Hollingsworth, 133 S.
Ct. 786 (No. 12-144); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). It is
worth noting that lower courts have adopted different approaches to the question whether
Baker constitutes binding precedent. Compare, e.g., McConnell v. United States, 188 F.
App'x 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006) (following Baker); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 130405 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (same); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 999 (Wash. 2006)
(same), and Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (same), with e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 872 (C.D. Cal.
2005), affd in part and vacated in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (Baker not binding),
and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (same).
135 E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 786 (No. 12-144).
136 In other words, folks will argue bitterly about whether the Court's decisions in Perry
and Windsor are correct, but they will do so regardless of which way the Court rules, and
the Court's decision to rule consistently or inconsistently with Baker will not feature in the
public consequences.
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liberties at the. expense of precedent, but not as easily restrict
them. That is, when precedents are restrictive, as in Miller,
Bowers, and Baker, they are not likely the sort upon which people
organize their lives. In contrast, opinions that expand protections
of liberty, like a case requiring recognition of same-sex marriage,
are much less easily undone because of the reliance-and
137
consequent investment-they induce.
2. Category 2: Cases That Could but Do Not Generate Reliance
Interests. There are additional circumstances in which cases
should be stripped of precedential force. These are cases that
could have given rise to reliance interests but for whatever reason
have not. In contrast to the cases in the first category, which may
be identified simply by considering their substance, cases in this
category may only be recognized after careful consideration of
their practical effects.
Consider, for example, Korematsu v. United States, in which the
Court in famously affirmed the legality of the federal government's
decision to detain Americans of Japanese descent in internment
camps during World War 11.138 Unlike with respect to Miller,
Bowers, and Baker, one might imagine that Korematsu could have
given rise to substantial reliance interests on the part of the
government. For example, the government could have created
long-term plans for the internment of particular ethnic groups in
the event of war with other countries. Likewise, it could have
constructed permanent internment facilities and a permanent
bureaucracy designed to implement detention orders. Arguably,
had the government consistently done so in reliance on Korematsu,
future courts would have had to give some precedential weight to
Korematsu.
But this is not what happened. Instead, Korematsu quickly fell
into disrepute. 139 The judgment of history rendered it unreliable,

Further analysis might reveal
137 This observation reflects only an initial impression.
that some kinds of liberty-restricting precedents do in fact induce reliance, and vice versa.
138 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944).
139 See Eang L. Ngov, When "The Evil Day" Comes, Will Title VII's Disparate Impact
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored To Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM.
U. L. REv. 535, 540 & n.29 (2011) (citing the "universal condemnation of Korematsu").
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and other branches of government have indeed not relied on it
since. 140 It has entered the "anticanon" of cases, which has
discouraged reliance.14 ' Under these conditions, if the Court were
faced with a similar question in the future, it would reasonably
discount Korematsu in rendering its decision.
This highlights a startling feature of the reliance approach: a
case's precedential status stems not from the fact that the
Supreme Court decided it, but rather from the fact that-and only
when-other actors rely on the Court's decision. In contrast to the
alternative approaches to precedent, this suggests that the Court's
analysis of whether to adhere to precedent should focus on the
actual effects of the earlier decision and the potential effects of
rejecting it.

3. Category 3: Cases in the Middle. The vast majority of cases
likely fall somewhere in the middle, in between nonprecedents like
Miller, Bowers, Baker, and Korematsu on the one hand and the
strongest precedents, such as those that undergird Social Security
on the other. These are cases that have generated reliance, but in
which the investments and potential losses due to overturning the
precedent are of a more limited magnitude. Such cases suggest
that the normative force accorded to a precedent is best considered
along a spectrum rather than as a binary choice. The greater the
reliance interests, the more heavily precedent should weigh on the
Court's decision, and vice versa. Here I offer two examples.
Consider the debate over the constitutionality of the individual
mandate to purchase health insurance under so-called
"Obamacare."' 42 As discussed above, the debate focused a great
deal on questions of precedent-to what extent is the individual
mandate meaningfully similar to or different from other laws that
have been upheld by the Court? 143 Framed this way, the discourse
140

See Harlan Grant Cohen, "Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of

History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957, 1013-14 (2010) (explaining how both Congress and the
Executive have disapproved of Korematsu).

Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (2011).
See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
143 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Compare Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (citing precedent for constitutionality of mandate), with id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy,
141
142
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was impoverished by its simplistic and mechanical focus on
analogizing and distinguishing cases, without any real substantive
focus on why it matters precisely how similar the individual
mandate is to previous laws. By approaching the debate with
reliance principles in mind, we may substantially refine the
analysis.
The critical issue is whether striking down the individual
mandate would have frustrated substantial reliance interests and
thereby required substantial and costly social reordering. Of
course, the Court had never upheld the individual mandate itself
in the past, so there was no argument that our current healthinsurance system assumed its constitutionality and would have
thus been thrown into chaos. In this narrow sense, then, striking
down the individual mandate as unconstitutional would not have
been an affront to reliance interests.
From a broader perspective, though, it may have implicated
reliance concerns. If the individual mandate is similar enough to
other laws that have been upheld by the Court and in which
society has invested heavily, then striking down the individual
mandate might have introduced substantial doubts as to the
continued viability of those laws. Conversely, if the individual
mandate can be distinguished in a principled way from these
precedents, then they should have had little force. I stress that
there must be a principled basis for distinguishing among the
cases because in the absence of one, the Court would offer little
guidance to the public for future cases and would thus have
introduced great instability and uncertainty into the law, thereby
interfering with reliance interests. In all likelihood, NFIB v.
Sebelius implicated reliance interests, but less so than the
prototypical case of Social Security.
B. EXPANDING PRECEDENT

The reliance approach to precedent also demands that we think
more broadly about what qualifies as precedent. If the key
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (distinguishing precedent
"unprecedented").
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justification for deferring to precedent is that judges should not
impose substantial costs on people for acting based on what they
reasonably understand the law to be, then we ought to apply
similar constraints on judges whenever people act consistently
with a reasonable understanding of the law. In other words, a
court should not look simply to its own earlier rulings as sources of
precedent. It must also consider other sources upon which people
develop reasonable reliance.
1. The Decisions of Sister and Lower Courts. Courts look to the
decisions of sister and lower courts as sources of what is referred
to as persuasive authority. 144 There is a great deal of uncertainty
concerning the value of this persuasive authority and its
justification. 145 After all, why should a court defer to a court from
a different jurisdiction or to one with a lesser degree of
146
authority?
One common response to this question is that such "precedents"
do not really have independent normative force, but that the
deciding court should carefully consider the substantive
arguments contained in them before reaching their conclusions. 147
The trouble is that this is not an argument for precedential effect
because a court should always carefully consider substantive
arguments that may have some merit, no matter what their
provenance. 148 There would be little reason to single out or
privilege, as we do, the decisions of sister and lower courts as
149
sources of special authority.
I suggest that the concept of persuasive authority is best
understood as an implicit acknowledgement or expression of the
reliance approach to precedent. The decisions of sister and lower
courts have independent normative force when, and to the extent
E.g., Flanders, supra note 4, at 56.
E.g., id. at 56-57; Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931,
1940-41 (2008) (questioning whether persuasive authority is actually an oxymoron of sorts).
146 See Flanders, supranote 4, at 56-57.
147 Id. at 65; Schauer, supra note 145, at 1947.
148 Flanders, supra note 4; Schauer, supra note 145, at 1947.
149 See Schauer, supra note 145, at 1947-48 ("[Llittle would differentiate the genuinely
persuasive opinion of a court located in a different jurisdiction from the genuinely
persuasive opinion of the judge's father-in-law.').
144
145
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that, they have generated legitimate reliance interests on the part
of the public. 150 In other words, what determines whether a court
should defer to the decisions of sister and lower courts is not
whether those courts were correct, but rather what effect they had
on the public.
Of course, the decisions of sister and lower courts should not
typically wield the same precedential force that a court's own prior
opinions do. This is because we internalize the distinctions
between courts and consequently do not typically develop strong
reliance interests on the basis of decisions of lower courts and the
courts of other jurisdictions. That is, we do not usually put as
much stock in the decisions of these courts and consequently do
not invest as much in the presumption that they will be upheld.
However, there are circumstances in which the decisions of
sister and lower courts may well generate substantial reliance,
and in these circumstances, they should be accorded precedential
weight. For example, if the courts are unanimous or nearunanimous in their opinions concerning a particular issue, if these
decisions are longstanding, and if they have become woven into the
fabric of a larger body of law, then people may justifiably rely on
these decisions. Under these circumstances, such decisions should
be considered precedential even among higher courts and courts of
other jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, the accumulation of
such sister- and lower-court decisions over time may carry more
weight than a single past decision of the deciding court. After all,
as we have already seen, some Supreme Court opinions generate
little or no reliance interests, 15' whereas some decisions by sister
and lower courts may give rise to substantial reliance interests. In
this sense, the reliance approach implies a sort of flattening of the
distinctions between "binding" and "persuasive" precedent. What
matters is not which court issued the precedent, but what the
ground-level effects of the precedent have been.
This approach may be embedded in, and help to sharpen, a
little-noticed argument between Justice Breyer, writing for the
150

Cf. Flanders, supra note 4, at 58 (outlining theory of a "hierarchy of persuasive

authority").
151 See supra Part W.A.
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majority, and Justice Scalia, concurring, in United States v.
Tinklenberg.152 The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that a
trial "shall commence within seventy days" after the
arraignment, 153 but it lists several exclusions from the seventy-day
period, including "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from
the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on,
or other prompt disposition of, such motion."' 54 The question
presented in Tinklenberg was "whether this provision stops the
Speedy Trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a
pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact
155
on when the trial begins."'
In an 8-0 opinion, 56 the Court held that, contrary to the Sixth
Circuit, it does.1 57 Justice Breyer's majority opinion begins with a
textual and contextual analysis of the statute that favors the
government. 158 He then offers several additional considerations in
support of this interpretation. In particular, he states that "we are
impressed that during the 37 years since Congress enacted the
Speedy Trial Act, every Court of Appeals ... implicitly or
explicitly, has rejected the interpretation that the Sixth Circuit
adopted in this case."' 59 After citing nearly fifteen lower court
opinions, Justice Breyer concludes that "[t]his unanimity among
the lower courts about the meaning of a statute of great practical
administrative importance in the daily working lives of busy trial
judges is itself entitled to strong consideration, particularly when
those courts have maintained that interpretation consistently over
a long period of time.' 6 °
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, argues that the text of the statute is
131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011).
at 2010 (quoting the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
154 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165 Id. at 2012.
156 Justice Kagan recused herself. Id. at 2010.
152

153 Id.

157

Id.

158Id. at 2012-13.
159Id. at 2014.
160 Id.
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clear and, therefore, resort to other tools of interpretation is
unnecessary. 161 He takes particular exception to Justice Breyer's
argument from the unanimity of the lower courts: "The clarity of
the text is doubtless why ...every Circuit disagrees with the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion.... Clarity of text produces unanimity of
Circuits-not, as the Court's opinion would have it, unanimity of
162
Circuits clarifies text."
Justice Scalia's position is clear enough: what matters is the

text, not the lower courts' interpretation of the text. At best, the
unanimity of lower courts is evidence as to the text's plain
meaning. 163 In contrast, Justice Breyer's opinion offers no
explanation why the unanimity of the lower courts on an issue is
ever relevant, or why the fact that the meaning of the statute is "of
great practical administrative importance in the daily working
lives of busy trial judges" matters. I suggest, however, that he
must have had in mind something similar to the reliance approach
to precedent. That is, because lower court judges-the group
regulated by the statute-have developed practices for handling
their dockets on the basis of a unanimous and longstanding
interpretation, that interpretation has generated reliance
interests.
This is not to say that the reliance approach necessarily leads to
Justice Breyer's conclusion. Rather, to evaluate the force of the
lower court precedent, it would be necessary to identify what costs
would flow from a departure from the lower-court precedents. If
the costs are negligible, then Justice Breyer's argument should
carry little force. But if the costs are high, then lower-court
precedent does provide an independent basis for the Court's
holding. Unfortunately, because the Justices seem not to have a

161

Id. at 2018 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

162

Id.

Note that even Justice Scalia, the avatar of originalism on the Supreme Court, is
sometimes willing to take precedent into account in interpreting statutes due to
considerations related to the reliance approach. Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning
and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation,2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1124. It may be
that Justice Scalia is simply unwilling to extend this principle to lower-court precedents.
163
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consistent account of precedent, the Court's consideration of the
164
issue lacks depth.
2. Equitable Estoppel in Administrative Law. Thus far, we
have considered the reliance approach only in the context of
judicial precedents. However, its animating principles also apply
in the administrative context. Administrative agencies and their
staffs constantly provide the public with guidance, advice, and
authoritative statements. 16 5 Such advice ranges from the most
informal to the most official. 166 As with judicial opinions, the
public takes such administrative pronouncements seriously as
sources of law-and administrative officials and judges would have
it no other way. As a result, the public is guided by the advice of
administrative officials in deciding how to behave. Such advice
should carry some degree of precedential force for the same
reasons that judicial opinions do, and it should impose similar
constraints on judges.
In other words, the statements of
administrative officials should sometimes constrain judges and
agencies because the public has justifiably relied on those
164 As I have suggested elsewhere, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), together provide another example of the Court
implicitly following the lower courts' lead based on reliance principles. Levin, supra note
163, at 1155; Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 149-53 (2010). I suggest there that the Court's application of
these principles is less than convincing, perhaps because the Justices have not developed an
articulated and coherent framework.
Other cases in which district court opinions may be especially powerful as sources of
precedent include those addressing issues that the Supreme Court rarely considers. For
example, rules governing discovery practices are primarily the province of district court
judges. Some district court opinions have dramatically influenced document-retention
practices even among corporations not bound by or subject to the district court. Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), one of the earliest and most
comprehensive district court decisions concerning retention of electronically stored
documents is a staple of most civil procedure casebooks, has provided a roadmap for
companies around the country. In other words, they have reasonably relied on it because
the higher courts are unlikely to provide any more or better guidance. As such, judges
should treat it as having precedential effect before imposing costs on those who have
conformed their behaviors to it.
165 See Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of
Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 348 (2009) ("Agencies
employ various means for establishing and implementing federal regulatory policy,
including administrative adjudications, informal rulemaking, and guidance documents.").
166

Id.
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pronouncements. The reliance approach thus provides a basis for
applying equitable estoppel in the administrative context. Simply
put, citizens should be entitled to rely on the advice of their
government.
The scholarly literature on this topic is extensive, and some
scholars and judges urge the courts to embrace equitable estoppel
in the administrative context. Nonetheless, although the Supreme
Court has never completely foreclosed the possibility of adopting
the doctrine, 167 it has typically rejected its application. 168 When
the Court has been asked to apply equitable estoppel based on the
advice of administrative officials, it has declined to do so. It is
therefore tempting to conclude that the doctrine does not exist.
However, when we look more closely, we find that not to be the
case. 169 Some lower courts have applied the doctrine, and some
Supreme Court Justices have embraced it as well.
167 The Court's current doctrine is that there may be some cases in which equitable
estoppel is appropriate, but the bar for its application against the government is far higher
than in the private context. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467
U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984) ("(I]t is well-settled that the Government may not be estopped on the
same terms as any other litigant. [The Government] urges us to expand this principle into
a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the Government. We
have left the issue open in the past, and do so again today. Though the arguments the
Government advances for the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary
to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the
countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and
reliability in their dealings with their Government." (footnote omitted)).
168 E.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990); Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789-91 (1981); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383-86
(1947).
169 Although the Court does not appear to have ever explicitly accepted an argument based
on equitable estoppel against the government, it does appear to have implicitly adopted some
version of the doctrine or its animating principles. For example, in Moser v. United States, 341
U.S. 41 (1951), although the Court disclaimed equitable estoppel as the basis for its opinion
against the government, id. at 47, many commentators interpret the opinion as expressing
some form of equitable estoppel, e.g., 4 CHARLES H. KoCH, JR., ADNMNIsTRATIVE LAw AND
PRACTICE § 12:36 (3d ed. 2010). Likewise, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, although the
Court held that the government was not estopped based on agency advice, the party that
sought the agency's advice was nevertheless entitled to partial relief based on its justifiable
reliance on that advice. 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also United States v. Indus. Pa.
Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973) (applying due process in a manner similar to equitable
estoppel to prevent the government from imposing criminal liability against a defendant who
had been assured by the agency that its conduct was lawful).

1080

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1035

A leading case in which a lower federal court applied equitable
estoppel against the government is Alaska ProfessionalHunters v.
FAA, 70 which concerned Alaskan hunting and fishing guides who
pilot light aircraft as part of their services. The D.C. Circuit
considered whether an agency's longstanding informal, oral advice
to the guides could be overturned by the agency's announcement
that it would no longer follow that policy. 171 The court held that
the agency could not simply adopt a new policy because its prior
informal guidance had been given and adhered to consistently over
time by the agency, and because the regulated community had
justifiably relied on and invested resources on the basis of the
advice. 72 Instead, if the agency wanted to change its enforcement
policies, it would have to promulgate an official regulation. 173 In
other words, the agency's advice constituted a sort of precedent
that bound the agency and court. As the court put it, "[t]hose
regulated by an administrative agency are entitled to 'know the
rules by which the game will be played.' [The guidees] relied on
the advice FAA officials imparted to them [and organized their
affairs accordingly]. ''174 Therefore, the only way to change the
policy was for the agency to engage in a rulemaking process that
would provide those affected by the rule an opportunity to make
their case and that could yield a policy mitigating the costs that
would be incurred by those who had relied on the earlier policy.
The Ninth Circuit also applied equitable estoppel against the
government in Watkins v. United States Army. 175 In that case, the
U.S. Army had refused to reenlist the plaintiff on the grounds that
he was homosexual. 176
The applicable rules suggested that
homosexuals would be excluded from the military. 7 7 However, the
Army had previously permitted Watkins to reenlist despite its

170

177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

171

Id.

172

Id. at 1035-36.

173 Id.

Id. at 1035 (citation omitted).
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
176 Id. at 702-03.
174

175

177

Id.
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knowledge of his homosexuality. 178
Consequently, he invested
heavily in his career. The court applied equitable estoppel and
required the Army to allow him to reenlist. 179 Likewise, in Griffin
v. Reich,. a district court held that the government's
representations concerning wage requirements in the context of a
government contract could give rise to equitable estoppel. 8 0
Further, some Supreme Court Justices have expressed support
for equitable estoppel. In United States v. Locke, Justice O'Connor
argued in a concurrence that an agency's advice that paperwork
could be filed with the agency through December 31 may estop the
government from applying the plain language of the statute, which
provided that the paperwork must be filed "prior to December
31."181 Likewise, Justice Powell argued in dissent that due
process-animated
by
similar
principles-prevented
the
82
government from applying the plain language of the statute.
What all of this demonstrates is that the principles that
animate the reliance approach to judicial precedent also operatealbeit in considerably muted and weakened form-in the context of
administrative agencies.
In effect, judges sometimes feel
compelled to treat some kinds of agency behaviors and
pronouncements as having precedential force. Simultaneously,
however, the reliance approach suggests that the courts ought to
embrace estoppel more than they do, and the failure of the courts
to forthrightly express these principles has cramped their
83
application.

178

Id. at 702.

179Id. at 711. Lower federal courts have also adopted some form of equitable estoppel.
Amanullah v. Cobb, 862 F.2d 362, 367 (1st Cir. 1988); cf. United States v. Argo, 925 F.2d
1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991) (Tang, J., dissenting). But see Yerger v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 460,
466 (9th Cir. 1992); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. OWCP, 976 F.2d 934, 937-38 (5th Cir.
1992). State courts also sometimes apply equitable estoppel against the government. E.g.,
Appeal of Eno, 495 A.2d 1277, 1281-82 (N.H. 1985).
180 956 F. Supp. 98, 109-10 (D.R.I. 1997).
181471 U.S. 84, 111 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 112 (Powell, J., dissenting).
183 It is noteworthy that European and British law are more explicit about the role of
equitable estoppel and legitimate expectations in administrative law. See ROBERT THOMAS,
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 44-57 (2000)

(comparing European and British approaches to reliance interests in administrative law).
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3. Public Discourse and Practice. The final and potentially
most controversial extension of precedential status under the
reliance approach is to the discourse and practices of the public.
In some circumstances, people reasonably look to social cues to
understand what the law requires of them. Indeed, given the
broad reach and complexity of the law, it would be unrealistic, and
therefore unfair, to expect otherwise.
Thus, based on social
practices, people may develop reliance interests that courts should
be wary of undermining.
The principal difficulty in extending precedent to social
discourse and practice is that it is difficult to precisely identify the
point at which public understanding gains sufficient legitimacy to
constrain courts. I consider this challenge at length later,18 4 but
for present purposes I suggest that the hallmarks for courts ought
to be: first, whether the behavior or understanding is widespread,
and second, whether legal authorities are aware of the practice
and have given implied or actual consent to it. To be sure, this
leaves much gray area, and reasonable minds will differ in specific
cases as to whether reliance is legitimate. But, once again, this
approach at least provides guidance to courts as to what questions
to ask. Unfortunately, judges rarely ask such questions.
I offer three brief case studies to illustrate how the development
of reliance interests based on social behavior and discourse may
operate as a form of precedent. In the first two examples, the
courts did not explicitly consider reliance interests, but the
opinions would have benefited from such an analysis and are best
understood and defended through the reliance lens. By contrast,
in the third case, the court was unusually explicit in its
consideration of these principles.
a. In re Rachel L.18 5 One example of a court implicitly
applying the reliance approach is a California appellate court case
concerning the legality of homeschools.1 8 6 With limited exceptions,
the governing statute appeared to prohibit parents from
184
185

See infra Part V.B.
In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by Jonathan L. v.

Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
186

Id.
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homeschooling their children.1 8 7 In a straightforward application
of the rules of statutory interpretation, the court initially held that
most homeschooling was unlawful under the statute. 8 8 Upon
reconsideration, however, the court reversed course and held that
the statute permits homeschooling as a statutorily permitted form
of private schooling. 8 9 To reach this conclusion, the court
stretched the rules of statutory interpretation beyond
plausibility. 190
A better justification for upholding homeschooling under the
statute would have been for the court to forthrightly acknowledge
that as many as 250,000 children are homeschooled each year;
that the children's parents made the choice to homeschool with the
full knowledge and tacit encouragement of California's
administrative and legislative authorities and therefore developed
a legitimate belief that their actions were lawful; and that the
sudden declaration that homeschooling is unlawful would have
had unpredictable effects and imposed numerous uncertainties
and costs on affected families and the public school system. 19'
In other words, the court would have been better off had it
transparently reasoned that, for the very same reason that courts
should not overturn their own precedents, it should uphold the
public understanding and practice concerning homeschooling.
This would have been a more honest and persuasive defense of its
holding than the court's interpretive contortions. Thus, the court's
intuition and impulse may have been correct, but the absence of
explicit doctrine concerning the normative force of reliance
interests deprived the court of the best vocabulary for addressing
the issue.
b. Sherley v. Sebelius. 192 Another case that would have
benefited from a reliance analysis is Sherley v. Sebelius, in which
the plaintiffs challenged government funding of human embryonic

187 1

have discussed this case extensively elsewhere. Levin, supra note 163, at 1144-49.

188 Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 84.

189 JonathanL., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589-90.
190 See Levin, supra note 163, at 1145-47.
191Id. at 1148-49.
192 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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stem cell research based on a 1996 statute that prohibited such
funding for "research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed."'193 The question presented by the case was whether
this statute prohibited funding of research on embryonic stem cells
where the destruction of the human embryo was undertaken with
only private funding. 194 That is, the NIH did not fund the
destruction of the embryos necessary to the extraction of its stem
cells, but it did fund subsequent research using the stem cells or
"lines" derived from them.
Sherley presents a fascinating set of statutory interpretation
questions. Chevron deference, plain meaning, legislative history,
congressional intent, and purposivist arguments abound in the
briefs and judicial opinions. 195 An opinion tally suggests that the
case is a close one: the district judge and one judge on the court of
appeals sided with the plaintiffs, holding that the plain language
of the act prohibited funding of such research, while the two-judge
court of appeals majority reached the opposite conclusion.
However, if the courts had viewed the case through a reliance lens,
its outcome would have been clearer.
At the time the statute was enacted in 1996,196 the policy
challenged in Sherley was not addressed because technology had
not yet been developed that allowed for the extraction of human
embryonic stem cells. 197 In 1999, under President Clinton, the
Executive Branch adopted the position that human embryonic
stem cell research would be federally funded if the stem cells were

193Id. at
194 Id.

390.
at 391.

195 For example, the appellants argued that "[wihen Congress reenacted the DickeyWicker amendment after President Bush's announcement of his policy, the relevant
Committees made clear that the legislative language did not impose a ban on research
using embryonic stem cells" and also appealed to Chevron deference in arguing that the
district court had failed to accord proper deference to "NIH's consistent and longstanding
interpretation of the statute." Brief for Appellants at 12, 19, Sherley, 644 F.3d 388 (No. 105287). The appellees claimed that the plain meaning of the statute supported their
interpretation of it, arguing that the statute was unambiguous. Brief for Appellees at 1419, Sherley, No. 644 F.3d 388 (No. 10-5287). The court concluded that the statute was
ambiguous and thus Chevron deference should apply. Sherley, 644 F.3d at 394.
19 Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. 3034, 3280-81 (2009).
197 Sherley, 644 F.3d at 390.
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procured from a process in which the human embryo was not
Thus, the Administration
destroyed using federal funds. 198
introduced the position subsequently defended in Sherley.
In 2001, President Bush's Administration adopted a different
policy. 199 The government would no longer fund research involving
new human embryonic stem cells and "lines."20 0 However, the
government would continue to fund research involving human
embryonic stem cell lines that had been created by privately
funded researchers before the adoption of the new policy.20 1 Thus,
the Bush Administration agreed that the statute permitted federal
funding for research that required the destruction of human
embryos, so long as the destruction itself was privately funded.
Finally, in 2009, President Obama's Administration adopted a new
set of regulations that essentially restored the Clinton
20 2
Administration's policy.
At no point during these ten years did Congress intervene to
ban funding for all research on human embryonic stem cells that
required the destruction of human embryos. In fact, in the years
after the Bush Administration announced its policy, Congress
passed multiple bills that would have eased such restrictions and
at least reintroduced the Clinton-era approach. 20 3 During the
congressional debates, opponents of these new bills never
suggested that both the Clinton and Bush policies violated the
1996 law or that the new legislation would overturn it. Thus, both
branches of government consistently signaled support for what
became the Sherley defendants' position.
It was therefore
reasonable for medical researchers to conclude that federal
funding would be available for at least some human embryonic
stem cell research and to develop substantial and legitimate

198Id. at 390-91.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Brief for Appellants, supra note 195, at 12.
202 Id. at 13.
203 E.g., Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. § 498D(b)

(2005). President Bush vetoed this bill. Library of Cong., Bill Summary & Status-109th
Congress (2005-2006)-H.R. 810-All Information, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dlO
9:HR00810:@@@L&summZ=ml (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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reliance interests as a result. Unfortunately, most of this history
is absent from the opinion.
Also missing from the opinion is any sense of what the real
stakes in the case were. In the years 2002-2011, the NIH issued
more than $650 million in grants for human embryonic stem cell
research. 2 4 Scientists organized their laboratories and focused
their research based on the availability of such funding, and
students surely relied on it in developing their expertise and
research agendas.
In other words, the reasonable public
understanding that funding for such research was lawful and
available led people to organize their lives and invest their
resources in reliance. For the court to rule to the contrary would
greatly disrupt the lives and professions of those who reasonably
relied on longstanding and widespread practices that enjoyed the
longstanding support of both parties in government. While the
costs imposed by such a ruling would hardly rise to the level of a
Supreme Court declaration that the Social Security system is
unconstitutional, it should count for something-and perhaps be
dispositive in an otherwise close case.
The appellate court's holding in the case is, in the end,
consistent with the reliance approach. However, its decision to
ignore all of the facts related to reliance interests and instead to
focus exclusively on doctrines of statutory interpretation is
unfortunate, even as it reflects the typical practice among courts.
It impoverishes the analysis because it treats the law as entirely
removed from human experience and the moral implications
inherent in confounding public understanding of the law. It also
makes the case much more difficult than it needs to be.
c. United States v. Nosal. 20 5 In contrast to Rachel L. and
Sherley, the Ninth Circuit's recent en banc decision in United
States v. Nosal offers an unusually candid application of the
reliance approach. The question in Nosal was whether individuals
who violate employer computer policies or the terms of service of
social-networking sites are potentially criminally liable under the
204

See NIH Stem Cell Research Funding, FY 2002-2012, NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH, http:I/

stemcells.nih.gov/researchlfunding/pages/Funding.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
205 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 20 6 Under the CFAA, a
person is liable if he or she "access[es] a computer without
authorization and... use[s] such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to
obtain or alter." 20 7 In prosecuting Nosal, the government argued
that this provision criminalizes accessing an employer's computer
in a way that violates the employer's computer policies. The
defendant argued that the provision only targets a particular form
of hacking, namely where someone is "authorized to access only
certain data or files but accesses unauthorized data or files." 208
The majority's analysis applies many of the standard tools one
would expect to see in a case presenting a statutory interpretation
question: plain meaning, 20 9 the whole act rule, 210 the rule of
2 11
interpreting statutes consistently with preexisting common law,
and legislative history and purpose. 21 2 But the bulk of the opinion
focuses on the fact that, as the majority puts it, "[w]ere we to adopt
the government's proposed interpretation, millions of unsuspecting
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal
conduct." 21 3 Substantively, this is a reliance argument, and it
convinced the majority to reject the approach of all of the other
federal appellate courts to have considered the issue 214 and to
adopt what the dissent refers to as an interpretation that "distorts
the obvious intent of Congress" and the "perfectly clear" meaning
5
of the statute. 21

Id. at 856.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006).
208 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856-57.
209 Id. at 863. The plain meaning rule "prohibits consideration of nontextual sources in
the absence of statutory ambiguity." Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratoriesof Statutory
Interpretation:Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J.
1750, 1755 (2010).
210 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859. This rule calls for the interpreter to consider the textual
context of the rest of the statute. Gluck, supranote 209, at 1763 & n.37.
211 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857; Gluck, supra note 209, at 1825.
212 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858; Gluck, supra note 209, at 1763.
213 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859.
206
207

214

Id. at 862.

215

Id. at 864 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
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Chief among the majority's concerns was that under the
government's reading of the statute, anyone who uses an
employer's computer in a way that violates the employer's
policies-for example, by playing games, surfing the web, or
conducting personal business-or who uses a social-networking
site in a manner that violates the site's terms of service is engaged
in criminal conduct. 2 16 The opinion discusses at great length the
public's reasonable expectation and understanding to the
contrary. 2 17 For example, the court states that the public "ha[s]
little reason to suspect that they are committing a federal crime"
when they engage in such activities; 218 that personal use of work
computers is a routine and general public practice; 219 that
employer-employee relationships are usually governed by tort and
contract rather than criminal law; 220 that criminal liability would
turn on employee agreements that the public would have difficulty
interpreting; 22 1 that the public cannot be expected to understand
and abide by all of the terms-of-service agreements imposed by
websites; 222 that the government's interpretation would turn
unsuspecting children who use websites that prohibit use by
minors into "juvenile delinquents," and their parents into
"delinquency contributors";223 and that criminal liability could
change at any moment, since websites retain the right to change
224
their terms of service without notice.

at 860 (majority opinion) ("Basing criminal liability on violations of private
216 Id.
computer use policies can transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.").
217 1 am tempted to quote the entirety of the court's lengthy and colorful discussion
because it so beautifully makes the point, but the journal-editor overlords typically (and
correctly) do not look kindly on multipage block quotes. Therefore, I encourage readers to
simply read the relevant portion of the opinion. See id. at 859-62.
218

Id. at 859.

Id. at 860 ("Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and the computer gives
employees new ways to procrastinate . .
219
220

Id.

Id. ("Significant notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the
vagaries of private policies that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read.").
221
222

Id. at 861.

223

Id.

224

Id. at 862.
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All of these arguments evidence the court's profound discomfort
with interpreting a criminal statute to conflict with broad and
legitimate public understanding and behaviors in a way that may
lead to arbitrary, malicious, and discriminatory enforcement. 225 To
be sure, the court ultimately uses these arguments as a basis for
applying the familiar rule of lenity. 226 But as I have argued
elsewhere, the rule of lenity is best understood as an expression of
Indeed, all of the formal tools of
reliance principles. 227
interpretation that the court references in favor of its conclusion
resonate with the reliance approach in this context. For example,
the court references the doctrine that ambiguous statutes are to be
The best
construed consistently with the common law. 228
explanation for this rule, at least in this context, is that it imposes
a kind of stability on the law and protects the justified expectation
of the public that longstanding law would not be overturned
without explicit consideration by the legislature. The same is true
of the court's references to the statute's purpose and legislative
history; the court notes that Congress's focus and intent was to
respond to the problem of hacking rather than computer use that
violates employer and website policies. 229 Likewise, the court
argues from the broader legal structure that the kinds of behavior
targeted by the prosecution in this case are the subject of different
statutes and areas of the law, and it would be unlikely for
230
Congress to have addressed this behavior in a hacking statute.
All of this suggests that the reliance approach, even in its most
radical manifestations, is embedded deeply in legal doctrine.
Unfortunately, it is embedded so deeply that it is typically
overlooked; Nosal's frankness is the exception rather than the
rule.
225 Id. at 860 ("Ubiquitous, seldom-prosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.").
226 Id. at 863.
227 See Levin, supra note 163, at 1128 ("The rule of lenity is justified by the principle that
a law can only have force if the regulated community can reasonably understand the law.");
see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
228 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857.
229 Id. at 858.
230Id. at 860.
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V. OBJECTIONS AND REFINEMENTS

Given its far-reaching implications and the revisionary account
it offers for precedent, the reliance approach inevitably invites
challenges. In this Part, I identify two potential objections to the
approach and, in addressing them, consider some possible
refinements that deepen our understanding of its operation. I also
suggest that our formalist discourse concerning precedent has
developed to tacitly acknowledge reliance interests but
simultaneously blunt its force in response to some of the problems
it raises.
A. THE EVIL PRECEDENT PROBLEM

One potential objection to the reliance theory of precedent is
that it may require courts to uphold undesirable precedents. This
objection is best illustrated by the case of Brown v. Board of
Education,231 which, as every law student knows, effectively
overturned the longstanding precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson.232
One could argue that Plessy generated substantial reliance on the
part of the public, and that Brown imposed precisely the kinds of
costs associated with reordering society that the doctrine of
precedent is meant to protect against. In other words, if this
approach to precedent is correct, then wasn't the Brown court
wrong to overturn Plessy?
Note first that any theory of precedent must grapple with this
problem. That is, anyone who believes that precedent should carry
normative force--which is to say, nearly everyone 233-must
account for Brown. Arguably, the reliance approach fares better in
this regard than other approaches because of the ways in which it
limits precedential force. 234 Thus, there may be any number of evil
precedents that courts could readily ignore simply because those

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 494-95, overrulingPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
233 One notable exception is Lawson, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that "the practice of
following precedent.., is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution").
234 See supra Part IV.A.
231
232
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precedents do not implicate the reliance principles, 235 and there
are other cases that have given rise to fairly limited reliance
236
interests, in which case precedent would weigh less heavily.
This point does not help us in the specific case of Plessy, around
which large segments of society did in fact organize themselves,
but as a general matter, the reliance approach has less to answer
for with respect to this problem than do other approaches.
One response to the evil precedent problem is that precedent is
but one factor for judges to consider, and it must be weighed
against other countervailing factors and the costs associated with
upholding precedent. In particular, because the reliance approach
maintains that the power of precedent is based on a moral
principle, 237 it may be outweighed where a judge believes that the
precedent was wrongly decided and that there are stronger moral
considerations on the other side. Thus, if the Justices concluded
that practice had shown that Plessy's separate-but-equal rationale
violated equal protection, then the moral dimension to the Equal
Protection Clause-that people should not receive worse treatment
by the law simply on account of their skin color-offers a basis for
rejecting precedent.
In broader terms, this means that adherence to even the
strongest precedents is not an absolute command. While this may
be unsatisfactory to some because it disclaims hard-and-fast rules
that could be readily applied in every case, the truth is that the
nature of judging is that it requires judgment. If we deem
multifactor tests in which judges must balance competing interests
unacceptable, then we ought to shut down our courts. After all,
such tests and the disagreements they produce are present and
tolerated throughout our legal order. What the reliance approach
to precedent accomplishes is that it offers a common basis for
analyzing certain legal questions, thereby channeling and focusing
discourse and disagreement. Judges may continue to disagree in
some cases, but they will disagree on common terms.

235
236
237

See supraPart IV.A.1.
See supraPart IV.A.2.
See supraPart III.C.

1092

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1035

A further response to the Plessy problem is that it may be a
mistake to view Brown's rejection of Plessy as undermining the
Indeed, the reliance
public's reasonable reliance interests.
approach to precedent may be consistent with Brown. Consider
Brown in its larger context, for it was not decided in a vacuum,
and it did not suddenly and unexpectedly overturn Plessy. Rather,
Brown was the inevitable culmination of a long series of legal and
social developments. 238 Advocates for equality did not push the
socially fraught issue of constitutionally mandated school
integration to the Supreme Court at the beginning of their assault
on segregation laws. 23 9 Instead, they advanced such cases at the
state, local, and district court level, while simultaneously bringing
240
less contentious challenges to segregation to the Supreme Court.
Over time, a strong trend and principle of integration emerged
from these cases, laying the groundwork for Brown. By the time
Brown was brought, attitudes toward segregation had
substantially shifted; the majority of the country viewed
segregated schools as an affront to equality.2 41 In other words, the
public understanding had disintegrated, and there was no longer
any general and reasonable reliance belief that Plessy would
remain in place.
In this way, advocates and the courts adopted an incrementalist
reshaping of precedent and public understanding that the reliance
238 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7, 10 (1994) (arguing that "racial change in America was inevitable owing to a
variety of deep-seated social, political, and economic forces" and "the Brown decision was
judicially conceivable in 1954 only because the forces for change had been preparing the
ground for decades").
239 For an in-depth account of such advocates' long-term approach to litigation, see MARK

V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950

(1987).
240 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding unconstitutional the
University of Texas Law School's denial of admission to blacks because the proposed law
school for blacks was not substantially equal); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938) (holding Missouri could not deny admission to its law school to blacks because
there was no separate in-state law school for blacks).
241 A Gallup poll taken shortly after Brown was handed down found that 54% of people
agreed with the Court's decision. Jack Ludwig, Race and Education: The 50th Anniversary
of Brown v. Board of Education, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.gallup.comI
poll11521/race-education-50th-anniversary-brown-board-education.aspx.
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theory permits and encourages. Indeed, by the time Brown was
decided, no one-not even those who decried it-could have
reasonably claimed to be surprised by the Court's ruling. To be
sure, there was opposition to Brown, and Brown required
opponents to make changes in their lives that they did not like and
that may have cost them whatever investment they had in Plessy.
But this was more due to a strong disagreement with the principle
of integration than to a fair expectation on the basis of Plessy that
segregated schools would forever remain available.
What makes this account especially compelling is that the
Court itself seems to have been cognizant of the potential for social
upheaval that Brown might engender. It is likely for this very
reason that the Court included the fateful words "with all
deliberate speed" in its order. 242 The Justices were apparently
bothered by the potential costs that could arise due to their
rejection of precedent, and the "deliberate speed" language was
intended to give states and schools the time and latitude to
develop and implement plans for the integration of the schools.
One troubling implication of understanding Brown in this
manner is that it suggests that the Court would have been on
shakier ground had it decided a case like Brown before the
groundwork had been laid. That is, if Brown is seen as consistent
with the reliance approach to precedent, then perhaps the Court
would have been morally compelled to uphold Plessy before 1954,
and the reliance approach might still require courts to uphold evil
precedent in some cases. As difficult as this may be to accept-we
all wish for courts to achieve just results in all cases-we should
ultimately acknowledge that any neutral jurisprudential theory
will have to tolerate bad results in some cases. The benefit of the
reliance approach is that it offers an avenue for the pivot away
from precedent and for incremental progress toward legal change.
A correlated benefit of this relative judicial conservatism is that
it requires greater social and political engagement on the part of
advocates for legal change. They cannot assume that the courts
will solve their problems for them with a stroke of the pen, and

242

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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they must therefore work on multiple fronts simultaneouslyshaping public opinion, advocating before the political branches,
working in the states, and moving incrementally in the courts-in
order to achieve significant social and legal change. Such efforts
are far more likely to produce meaningful and lasting change than
a single Supreme Court opinion ever could. Although it may come
at a cost of tolerating some evil precedents like Plessy for longer
than we would like, the reliance approach fosters more substantial
civic engagement and is thus more consistent with democratic
principles than is unpredictable judicial action. In this sense, the
majoritarian-affirming tendency of the approach may be at least as
243
much of a feature as it is a bug.
243 Intriguingly, this reliance approach to Brown gives a normative justification for what
we typically think of as lawyers' strategic calculations. Activists for social and legal change
on issues like recognition of same-sex marriage, limiting abortion rights, and death-penalty
reform have turned to the courts in the hopes that they will achieve quick and far-reaching
victories, but they have been disappointed in each case. These disappointments have led
advocates to implement incrementalist strategies to achieve their desired reforms rather
than relying on the Supreme Court.
For example, same-sex marriage advocates have slowly developed a favorable body of
law by making public arguments for their cause, seeking victories in state legislatures,
litigating in carefully chosen state courts, bringing more limited lawsuits in the federal
courts (including challenges to anti-sodomy laws and the Defense of Marriage Act), and
seeking more limited forms of recognition for same-sex relationships. See, e.g., Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); In re Golinski, 587 F.3d
901 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing denial of health benefits to homosexual); Collins v. Brewer,
727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) (granting preliminary injunction against denial of
health-care coverage to homosexuals). Advocates for same-sex marriage now seek complete
relief in the federal courts, but only after they built substantial public support and amassed
favorable precedents. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), granting cert.,
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
Similar stories can be told about conservative efforts to prohibit or limit abortion rights
and liberal efforts to abolish the death penalty. Abortion opponents were disappointed both
by Roe's refusal to grant fetuses constitutional protection and by its grant of expansive,
constitutionally guaranteed abortion rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 165-66 (1973).
They were again disappointed when the Court in Casey dashed their hopes by upholding the
core of Roe. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-79 (1992). Since
then, conservatives have had remarkable success in slowly eroding the Roe framework and
limiting access to abortion with state legislative victories and by successfully defending
incremental restrictions in the federal courts. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (upholding ban on partial-birth abortions); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding laws requiring physicians to
disclose sonogram and fetal heartbeat before performing an abortion); O'Brien v. Mayor &
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B. THE TIPPING POINT PROBLEM

The second problem with the reliance approach is what I call
the tipping point problem. Succinctly stated, the tipping point
problem is that if the key to precedent lies in public reliance, then
it may be difficult for judges to assess whether enough reliance
interests have legitimately arisen such that they ought to be
protected. This challenge may be broken down into a series of
related questions about the approach: How much public reliance is
enough to create a precedent that should be adhered to? When is
such reliance reasonable?
When has there been sufficient
incremental roll-back to reject earlier precedents? And finally,
why would we believe that judges are at all qualified to make
judgments about public reliance?
As observed above, 244 the judicial enterprise implies the
application of judgment. There may be no hard-and-fast rules for
applying the approach, but judges must balance competing
interests and make judgment calls in a wide variety of contexts.
The reliance approach simply requires them to make different
ones. 245 At the very least, we would know what the terms of the
City Council of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011) (striking down a city ordinance
requiring providers of pregnancy-related services to post a conspicuous sign in their waiting
rooms concerning the availability of abortion).
Likewise, when death penalty opponents failed in their attempts to ban the practice in
the Supreme Court, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 523 (1976), they achieved some success by
turning to incrementalist strategies in the states and federal courts, see, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (eliminating death penalty for those under the age of
eighteen); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (eliminating death penalty for insane
persons); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (eliminating death penalty for rape of
adults). Eventually, if advocates for these causes continue to be successful in their
incremental efforts and win public support, and if the Supreme Court appears favorably
disposed, they will use these smaller victories as building blocks for a much broader legal
assault-and the incremental developments will give the courts a framework and
justification for revisiting their earlier decisions.
Typically, this account of legal change is offered as merely descriptive. That is, it
explains how savvy lawyers strategize to achieve their results. But, viewed through the
lens of the reliance approach, it provides a normative account as well, explaining why this
approach can work, and indeed why-putting aside the underlying substantive arguments
in each case-it should.
244 See supra Part V.A.
245 With respect to the question of what constitutes "reasonable" reliance, I note that
reasonableness is an especially common standard in the law, and "reasonable reliance" is
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debate over precedent are, which is a vast improvement over the
status quo, in which everyone argues about precedent but no one
articulates why. Judges and advocates would have to refocus their
arguments and inquiries to clearly articulate what they believe the
public understands, on what basis, and what the effects of
disturbing that understanding would be. The connection between
legal doctrine and ground-level practices would be openly explored
and would represent a primary focal point for judicial inquiry.
To be sure, this response may be incomplete because the types
of judgments that judges would be required to make in applying
this approach to precedent may be different in kind from the types
of judgments they must make in other circumstances. Requiring
judges to identify what the public understands about the law and
the circumstances that gave rise to that understanding as well as
to predict what the effects of their ruling on people's reliance
interests will be, is meaningfully different from requiring them to
interpret texts, articulate and apply legal principles, and analogize
and distinguish facts. Judges are trained and have a claim to
expertise with respect to the latter, but perhaps not the former.
One response is that simple judicial acknowledgement of the
role of reliance would aid us in identifying proxies and heuristics
that judges may use. Judges would consider, for example, the
number of times a precedent has been upheld, how often lower
courts cite to it, whether there is disagreement among courts that
have considered the matter, how connected it is with the larger
fabric of the law, how carefully past courts considered the issue,
the size of the majority that created the precedent, how many
people would be subject to legal consequences if the court rejects
the precedent, and so on. 246 Indeed, such considerations are
already present in the law. If nothing else, the reliance approach
also an element in other areas of the law. I see little reason why this question is more
problematic in this context.
246 See Levin, supra note 163, at 1140-44 (outlining factors for public reliance); see also
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 452-64
(2010) (noting that "[dieveloping a framework to analyze reliance interests requires
identifying the discrete ways in which reliance on a precedent can manifest itself' and
examining some such ways); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Originalismand Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 844 (2009) (noting factors for reliance).
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provides a coherent account for why, 247 once again demonstrating
the descriptive power of the approach.
There is a related way to address the tipping point problem. At
first glance, there appears to be considerable tension between the
doctrinal language used to discuss precedent and the reliance
account. On the one hand, the doctrinal discourse is dominated by
formal categorization. We have binding precedent, persuasive
precedent, dicta, and so forth. These categories imply mechanical
distinctions concerning the power of different kinds of precedent.
For example, if a case qualifies as super-precedent, it may never
be overturned, whereas if it is merely dicta or persuasive
precedent, it imposes little or no constraint on subsequent courts.
On the other hand, the reliance approach flattens such distinctions
and categories because it suggests that we evaluate all potential
sources of precedent with the same set of questions: Did people
rely on it? Was the reliance legitimate? And what are the costs of
overturning the precedent?
The gulf between the doctrinal
discourse and the reliance account for precedent may suggest that
there is something of a poor fit between the two, or at the very
least that accepting the reliance account requires a substantial
doctrinal shift.
However, this is not the case. Instead, it may be that the quasiformalist discourse surrounding precedent arises precisely because
of the underlying force and potential reach of the reliance
approach. Categorization may also offer a way to mitigate the
tipping point problem.
By introducing ranked categories of
precedent, judges offer cues to the public as to what is legitimate
to rely upon and, accordingly, what will carry the most force.
Categorization sends the following message: Supreme Court
precedent is more worthy of public reliance than are lower court
opinions, which are more worthy than pronouncements from
administrative agencies, which are more worthy than social
practices. The public takes these signals into account in deciding
how to act. Thus, in shaping public reliance according to this

247

See supra Part III.c.
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categorical approach, the costs of openly embracing the reliance
248
approach may be mitigated.
Finally, it is worth acknowledging that, as with any farreaching legal theory, there are costs and unknowns associated
with the reliance approach and that it may produce uncertaineven poor-results in some cases. But these costs are dwarfed by
the benefits of the reliance approach, which provides a coherent
justification for precedent that is sensitive to the moral
implications of the judicial power and that offers both neutral
principles and practical tools for deciding whether and when
precedent should have normative force.
VI. CONCLUSION: REVISING THE GRAVITATIONAL ACCOUNT OF LAW
The reliance approach to precedent has potentially vast
implications. But perhaps its most important and broadest, if
abstract, implication is that it challenges the dominant narrative
of law. Legal rhetoric typically assumes and asserts that law is
intensely gravitational: it flows from the top (legislatures and
higher courts) to the bottom (lower courts, administrative
agencies, and the public at large). But the reliance approach
upsets this account by insisting that law does-must-flow the
other way as well. Precedent takes its power from its affect on the
public, and this, in turn, determines whether a court should give
normative force to precedent. Likewise, higher courts are and
should be constrained by the precedents developed by actors
further down the legal hierarchy. Judges and scholars would do
well to better articulate this bi-gravitational force and,
accordingly, to treat what goes on in lower courts and
administrative agencies, and even social norms and behaviors, as
potential sources of law.

248 Still, there will be cases, as we have seen, in which public reliance interests will
develop around even "lesser precedents" to the point at which it might be obligatory for
courts to recognize them as having normative force. Judges no doubt disagree about when

such a point has been reached. But there will always be difficult cases, whatever approach
to the law we have, in which judges, legal scholars, and the broader public will disagree
about the proper outcome.

